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The Administration of Zoning Flexibility Device
An Explanation for Recent Judicial Frustration
Recent Minnesota zoning cases have contained language
which, taken at face value, tends to subvert long-established governmental powers to regulate land use. The
author of this Note examines three such decisions arising
from the use of zoning flexibility devices, analyzes the
language that has occasioned concern, and considers
silent factors that may explain the results. He contends
the decisions should have been and possibly were
grounded on an unarticulated and entirely justifiable
concern with the absence of effective limitations upon
the administrationof the flexibility devices involved. He
concludes that even though the court reached correct
results in the subject cases, it should clarify its reasoning
to avoid confusion on the part of local governmental
officials and their counsel as to the scope of the zoning
power.

INTRODUCTION
"Courts Don't Understand Zoning" cried a Minneapolis suburban newspaper headline.' The accompanying article quoted a
city manager as declaring "I have a feeling that the [Minnesota]
Supreme Court does not fully understand the requirements of
zoning to protect citizens in general," although he admitted that
municipalities might share responsibility for the misunderstanding. The same article reported the complaint of a city
attorney that "the [Minnesota] Supreme Court has been holding
regularly in favor of owners of specific properties, probably without giving enough consideration to effects upon surrounding properties." Similar comments from other members of the bar reflecting concern and doubt as to the import of recent Minnesota
zoning decisions prompted the writing of this Note.
The burden of this Note is that the concern and doubt reflects
judicial language relating to matters which need not have been
considered by the court. This language includes such comments
as the use of the zoning power to effect authentic objectives; the
extent to which property value may be diminished through the
application of zoning regulations; limitations on the application
1. Kiperstin, Courts Don't Understand Zoning, St. Louis Park Dispatch,
July 23, 1964, p. 1, col. 5.
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of zoning ordinances to property purchased before their effective
date; the scope of appellate review of a trial court's findings; and
the relationship between nuisance and zoning law. It is submitted that the real issues raised by these cases, and obscured
by this language, involve the use of certain devices designed to
impart greater flexibility to the exercise of the zoning power.
In two of these cases the device used was a "special permit,"
and in a third it was a "hold order." In each, inadequate attention
was given the flexibility device and the manner of its use. Though
the results were probably correct, they ought to have been rested
on the absence of adequate limitations upon the use of the flexibility device rather than the factors relied upon by the court.
An analysis of the language contained in three of these decisions, together with an examination of unexpressed factors
which they share, may contribute to better understanding by
both municipalities and the judiciary of each other's responsibilities and problems in relation to the administration of the
zoning flexibility devices involved.
The procedure followed in this Note is to present brief abstracts of the subject cases, including the language within each
which has occasioned concern. Elements of this language are then
analyzed separately. Finally, attention is given the unconsidered
or inadequately considered factors upon which the decisions
arguably should have been rested-the absence of restrictions
upon the exercise of discretion in employing the zoning flexibility
devices. Consideration of other zoning flexibility measures or of
modern zoning philosophy in general, with its attributes and
deficiencies, is beyond the scope of this Note.
I. THE SUBJECT CASES
In Olsen v. City of Minneapolis2 plaintiff wished to construct
a service station on property that was zoned for commercial
use including service stations,' although located in a predominantly residential area near a school. A city ordinance
enacted subsequent to the zoning ordinance required that a
"special permit" be obtained from the city council before the
2. 263 Minn. 1, 115 N.W.2d 734 (1962).
3. The comprehensive zoning ordinance in force at that time provided
that all buildings and premises located in the commercial district could be
used, "except as otherwise provided in this ordinance," for any use permitted
in the multiple dwelling district or for any other use, and then specifically
enumerated exceptions which did not include gasoline filling stations. MwNEAPOLiS, MiNN., OaDiNANcES 1:31-5 (1959).
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construction of a service station was undertaken, but established
no standards for the council to use in acting upon permit
applications. 4 Upon the council's refusal to issue plaintiff a
permit, an action was commenced to compel issuance. The
trial court rejected the city's claims that the proposed service
station would create fire, traffic, health, and safety hazards and
enjoined interference with its construction. On appeal the supreme court affirmed, apparently holding that the council was
bound by the commercial classification of the property under the
comprehensive zoning ordinance in the absence of findings supported by the evidence that the proposed use would constitute
a nuisance, and pointing out that the city had not even claimed
that the service station would be a nuisance. Further, the court
noted that a trial court's findings of fact were entitled to the same
weight as a jury verdict and would not be reversed on appeal
unless manifestly contrary to the evidence. The court also speculated that the city's motive for rejecting the plaintiff's request
was fear that a filling station would not accord with neighborhood
development. Rejecting the propriety of such a motive, the court
declared that purely aesthetic considerations were an inadequate
basis for deprivation of property interests without compensation.6
Finally, the court asserted that one who acquires property classified under a comprehensive zoning ordinance should be able to
rely upon that classification as against the "arbitrary enactment
of amendments" which tend to diminish the value of the property."
Golden v. City of St. Louis Park7 also involved the denial of
a request for a special permit. Plaintiff wished to operate an auto
reduction yard on property located in a heavy industrial zone.
The city zoning ordinance provided that no structure or land in
a heavy industrial zone could be used for such a purpose except
by special permit granted by resolution of the city council.' It
also enumerated standards to be applied by the council in considering applications for special permits, though they were
essentially those contained in the state zoning enabling acts,
4. MDNNEAPous, MIm., ORDINANCES 1:17 (1959). The 1960 reenactment
of this section is substantially the same.
5. 263 Minn. at 11, 115 N.W.2d at 741.
6. 263 Minn. at 12, 115 N.W.2d at 741, citing, inter alia, State ex rel.
Foster v. City of Minneapolis, 255 Minn. 249, 97 N.W.2d 273 (1959).
7. 266 Minn. 46, 122 N.W.2d 570 (1963).
8. St. Louis Park, Minn., Ordinance 730 (Zoning), Dec. 28, 1959, §§ 6:142.6
(as amended), 6:193.
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with some deviations.' Finally, it provided that a motion of the
council denying a permit application constituted a finding and
determination that the standards for issuance of a permit had
not been satisfied.o In a suit for a declaratory judgment that the
plaintiff was entitled to a permit, the trial court held for the
plaintiff, rejecting the explanation proffered by the city for
denying the permit" and concluding that aesthetics formed the
primary reason for doing so. In affirming this decision, the supreme court held that there was ample evidence to sustain the
lower court's determination that the council's rejection of the
application was unrelated to promotion of the public health,
safety, or welfare, and was therefore arbitrary and unreasonable.
The court asserted that it was unconstitutional to destroy property rights without compensation solely to realize aesthetic
objectives.
In Alexander v. City of Minneapolis,12 plaintiff had purchased
property zoned for multiple dwellings to a height of six stories.
The city council subsequently passed a "hold order" prohibiting
the issuance of building permits for that property pending adoption of a new comprehensive zoning ordinance. Although a new
ordinance had never been enacted, plaintiff's application for a
building permit nine years later was refused on the basis of the
9. St. Louis Park, Minn., Ordinance 730, Dec. 28, 1959, § 6:193, provides
in part:
. . . the City Council shall consider the advices and recommendations of the Planning Commission and the effect of the proposed use
upon the health, safety and welfare of occupants of surrounding lands,
existing and anticipated traffic conditions, including parking facilities
on adjacent streets, and the effect on values of property in the surrounding area, and the effect of the proposed use on the Comprehensive Plan. If it shall determine by resolution that the proposed use
will not be detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of the
community nor will cause serious traffic congestion nor hazards, nor
will seriously depreciate surrounding property values, and that the
same is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this
ordinance and the Comprehensive Plan, the Council may grant such
permits and may impose conditions and safeguards therein.
The zoning enabling acts for municipalities of various sizes authorize the
use of zoning to promote the public "health, safety, order, convenience,
prosperity, and the general welfare." MmN. STAT. M§462.01, .05, .18 (1961).
10. St. Louis Park, Minn., Ordinance 730, Dec. 28, 1959, § 6:194.
11. The trial court thought that the city's claims that establishment of
the proposed auto reduction yard would create health, parking, traffic, law enforcement and drainage problems, adversely affect surrounding property
values, and constitute a nuisance were unfounded. See 266 Minn. at 52, 122
N.W.2d at 574.
12. 267 Minn. 155, 125 N.W.2d 583 (1963), 49 Mum. L. REV. 109 (1964).
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hold order. Prior to plaintiff's application, surrounding landowners had petitioned for a rezoning of his property. Before trial,
the city council had rezoned property including plaintiff's in accordance with the petition to permit multiple dwellings to a
height of only two and one-half stories. In plaintiff's action for a
declaratory judgment that he was entitled to a building permit,
the trial court invalidated both the hold order and the zoning
amendment as applied to plaintiff's property. On appeal the supreme court affirmed, holding that the state zoning enabling act
did not authorize the indefinite suspension or nullification of zoning ordinances by hold orders and, for grounds that are unclear,
that the amendment was also invalid as applied to this property.' 3
The court noted that application of the amendment would produce a substantial diminution in the value of plaintiff's property.
It also asserted that the enactment of "spot" zoning ordinances
or amendments to comprehensive zoning ordinances which result
in a "total destruction" or "substantial diminution" in value of
the affected property constitutes the taking of property without
due process of law. It declared that this was especially true where
the enactment is motivated by aesthetics. Finally, the court
intimated that the purchase of property with intent to use it as
the then effective zoning ordinance allows ordinarily gives the
purchaser a right so to use it.

II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOREGOING
JUDICIAL COMMENTS
A.

AESTHETICS AND THE ZONING POWER

In all three of the subject cases, the court asserted or strongly
intimated that zoning for solely aesthetic reasons is invalid. This
is the traditional view,14 although many courts have said that
zoning which is justifiable on other grounds is not invalid simply
because it incidentally reflects a desire to achieve aesthetic ends."
However, there is often an important difference between what
13. For a detailed analysis of this case, see 49 MINN. L. REv. 109 (1964).
14. See 8 McQunam, MuNiclaL, CoRoRATioNs § 25:29 (3d ed. 1959)
[hereinafter cited as McQurmm]; 1 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 11-1
(3d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as RATHKOPF]; 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND
PRACTICE § 17.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1964); Annot., 58 A.L.R.ed 1314, 1327 (1956).
15. A fairly representative statement of the traditional rule is given in
E.g., Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 375, 79 N.E. 745, 746 (1907): "The inhabitants of a city or town cannot be compelled to give up rights for purely
aesthetic objects; but if the primary and substantive purpose of the legislation is such as justifies the act, considerations of taste and beauty may enter,
in, as auxiliary."
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is said and what is done in this area. 0 Significant aesthetic motivations are sometimes ignored by the courts, and rarely faced
squarely. Thus the courts have upheld certain types of zoning
seemingly founded largely upon aesthetic considerations, e.g., billboard restrictions's and devices to protect historically significant
areas," without conceding that aesthetics is a permissible basis
for exercising the zoning power.
The United States Supreme Court indicated in a famous 1954
dictum that aesthetic considerations are within the scope of the
"public welfare."o True, this was said in an eminent domain
rather than a zoning case, so that it does not afford direct support for the proposition that zoning for purely aesthetic purposes
is within the police power.' Nevertheless, the statement does reflect considerable evolution in attitude during the last several
decades toward the role of aesthetic considerations in land-use
16. This was noted 35 years ago, Light, Aesthetics in Zoning, 14 MINN.
L. REV. 109, 122 (1930), and seems more obvious today. Compare Dukeminier,
Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal,20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218
(1955). As one commentator observed, "It must surely be admitted that much
zoning which is in fact inspired by aesthetic considerations achieves constitutionality by a somewhat spurious implied connection with the public health,
welfare, safety, or morals." PooLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED
STATES 85 (1961).
17. See Simpson v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 2d 60, 47 P.2d 474 (1935).
See also Chandler, The Attitude of the Law Toward Beauty, 8 A.B.A.J. 470,
472 (1922).
18. A recent Ohio decision upheld the constitutionality of statutes restricting the use of billboards near interstate highways. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v.
Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964). One commentator has suggested this decision impliedly held that aesthetics was a sufficient basis for
a valid exercise of the police power. 16 W. REs. L. REV. 431, 485 (1965). See
generally Moore, Regulation of Outdoor Advertising for Aesthetic Purposes,
8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 191 (1963).
19. See City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953)
(Vieux Carre section of New Orleans); Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 783,
128 N.E.2d 563 (1955) (Beacon Hill); Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773,
128 N.E.2d 557 (1955) (Nantucket); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964) (Santa Fe). See generally Comment, 29
FoRDHAM L. REv. 729 (1961).
20.
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.... If those who govern the
District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that
stands in the way.
Berman v. Parket, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
21. See PooLY, op cit. supra note 16, at 86-87.
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planning?2 One state court has seized upon it for support in upholding an ordinance restricting architectural design, although it
relied primarily upon the alleged tendency of architectural nonconformity to diminish substantially neighboring property
values.2 The latter ground, however, is of dubious validity, since
it has long been recognized that preservation of property values is
merely a derivative of zoning objectives - a by-product of the
desired end, which is the stabilization of the living and working
milieu? 4
The New York Court of Appeals has frankly considered the
propriety of zoning for aesthetic purposes and upheld the ordinance before it, 2 although some reliance was also placed upon the
tendency of the regulation to conserve property values? 6 It would
seem not only that aesthetics should be a proper basis for an exercise of the zoning power, but also that the courts probably would
uphold some ordinances based primarily on aesthetics. They have
had no difficulty finding that aesthetic considerations are proper
where one or more of the traditional bases for zoning are found to
exist. In fact it may well be that even where invocation of a conventional basis for zoning is unpersuasive in a particular case, the
courts will uphold the ordinance because the aesthetic undesirability of the prohibited use seems so clear. Many commentators
have therefore urged open recognition of the substantial role
played by aesthetics in zoning.27 The essentially subjective nature
22. Professor Rodda asserts that the change has been so great that the
traditional rule is now largely a fiction. Rodda, The Accomplishment of
Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 So. CAi. L. REV. 149, 150
(1954).
23. State ex. rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262,
69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955). The court said:
This court pointed out in . . . 1952 . . . that while the general rule

is that the zoning power may not be exercised for purely aesthetic considerations, such rule was undergoing development. In view of the
latest word spoken on the subject . . . in Berman v. Parker . . . this
development of the law has proceeded to the point that renders it
extremely doubtful that such prior rule is any longer the law.
Id. at 271, 69 N.W.2d at 222.
24. Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 87 HAnv. L. REv. 834, 840
(1924).
25. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.9d 734,
appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); see Anderson, Regulation of Land Use
for Aesthetic Purposes-An Appraisal of People v. Stover, 15 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 33 (1963); Comment, 64 Count. L. REv. 81 (1964).
26. People v. Stover, supra note 25, at 466, 191 N.E.2d at 274, 240
N.Y.S.2d at 737; Comment, 64 CoLuns. L. REv. 81, 90-91 (1964).
27. POOLEY, op. cit. supra note 16, at 89; Dukeminier, supra note 16, at
237; Kucera, The Legal Aspects of Aesthetics in Zoning, 1 INSTITUTE ON
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of aesthetics is doubtless the reason why courts have been reluctant to do so." It is therefore important that a reasonably objective standard be found to replace the old rule. The difficulty
inherent in drafting such a standard may well be the only barrier
perventing widespread acceptance of the validity of zoning to
achieve aesthetic objectives. 2 A standard might be based upon
community opinion as to the aesthetic merits of a certain use or
structure as reflected, for example, by a drop in market value of
surrounding property.30 Such a test would make the validity of
an ordinance depend not upon whether aesthetic views formed
the sole or primary basis for it, but rather whether they were
widely enough held to be classified as reasonably objective.'
It might be noted parenthetically that the Oregon court, in
Oregon City v. Hartke,32 recently reviewed the trend toward recognition of aesthetics alone as a sufficient basis for zoning. It held
that a city might entirely exclude automobile wrecking yards
21, 44 (1961); Moore, supra note 18, at 204; Comment, 29 FoRDHAm
L. Rnv. 729, 733 (1961); Comment, 13 HASTINGs L. J.
374, 381 (1962); Note, 15 Wyo. L. J. 77, 84 (1961); 13 OKLA. L. REV. 222,
223 (1960).
28. See City of Norris v. Bradford, 204 Tenn. 319, 324, 321 S.W.2d 543,
545 (1959): "'[W]hile public health, safety, and morals, which make for the
public welfare, submit to reasonable definition and delimitations, the realm
of the esthetic [sic] varies with the wide variations of tastes and culture.'"
Quoted from 58 Am. Jun. Zoning § 30 (1948).
29. It was probably for this reason that time has added credence to one
commentator's view: "While a strong trend is evident in favor of direct approval of aesthetic purposes in a number of situations, it may be expected
that the nominal general rule will die a slow and lingering death." Rodda,
supra note 38, at 179. See also Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and
Local Programs,50 IowA L. REV. 367, 390-91 (1965).
30. The property value standard has been criticized as insufficiently related
to the general welfare unless there is great and widespread diminution threatened. Symposium -Apartments in Suburbia:Local Responsibility and Judicial
Restraint, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 344, 389-90 (1964). Such diminution probably
should be balanced against other interests within the general welfare heading,
id. at 390, yet diminution of serious proportions in the aggregate and the
possibility of similar future diminution elsewhere in the municipality might
well be a sufficiently serious threat to the general welfare to justify preventive
zoning measures, see State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland,
269 Wis. 262, 270-71, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
Another proposal is to limit the aesthetic justification for zoning to situations where there is a clear public interest in the result sought to be achieved.
Symposium, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 344, 382 (1964).
A third suggestion is to use a reasonable man standard, i.e., "when from
an aesthetical point of view the minds of reasonable men cannot easily differ
PLANNING AND ZONING

." Kucera, supra note 27, at 49.

31. See POOLEY, op. cit. supra note 16, at 89.
32. 400 P.2d 255 (Ore. 1965).
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from its limits for solely aesthetic reasons, stating that "we join
in the view 'that aesthetic considerations alone may warrant an
exercise of the police power.' ""
It seems likely that even the Minnesota court, although perhaps not openly, would sustain some zoning measures based
mainly on aesthetic considerations. It has already sustained an
ordinance prohibiting projecting signs which was primarily aesthetically motivated. 4 Consequently, it seems unfortunate that
the subject cases have been used to create an unnecessary impediment to open recognition of the propriety of zoning to achieve
aesthetic objectives in future deserving situations. This may have
resulted from a misreading of the court's own precedents. In Olsen
the court cited State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton" for the
proposition that deprivation of property interests without compensation could not be justified on purely aesthetic grounds. The
Lachtman court had held that a city could not validly exercise its
police power to prohibit the construction of a store in a residential
3 however, the opinion
district. As one commentator has noted,"
suggests that the decision was based upon a finding that the store
would not constitute a nuisance. The court appears to have reasoned that since the presence of a retail store would not produce
"injurious consequences" of the kind associated with a nuisance,
any objection to it was based solely on aesthetic grounds; and
since restrictions on the use of property could not be imposed
under the police power for purely aesthetic reasons, the regulation of the subject property was invalid. Consequently, the Lachtman decision might well be regarded merely as an expression of
the early view that municipal land-use regulation could not go
beyond the elimination of nuisances. Further, in a somewhat later
case, State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, the
court upheld on reargumentV7 the condemnation of property to
achieve a restricted residence district free of apartment buildings
on the ground that this was a "public use." Adopting the view
of the dissent in the original decision and emphasizing the important effects of aesthetics upon neighboring property values, 8
33. 400 P.2d at 262.
34. Oscar P. Gustafson Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 231 Minn. 271, 42
N.W.2d 809 (1950).
35. 134 Minn. 226, 158 N.W. 1017 (1916).
36. WALKER, PLANNING FUNCTION IN URBAx GOVERNMENT 65 (2d ed.
1950).
37. 144 Minn. 13, 176 N.W. 159 (1920). The original opinion in this case
may be found in 144 Minn. 1, 174 N.W. 885 (1919).
38.
[T]he construction of ... apartments or other like buildings in a terri-
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the court stated that aesthetics might properly be considered in
determining whether property was taken for a "public use." Moreover, it strongly intimated that aesthetic considerations might
also afford a basis for exercise of the police power."9
However Lachtman is read, its implications for the propriety
of aesthetically motivated zoning were seriously weakened by the
Twin City decision, even though the latter dealt with condemnation rather than the police power. Moreover, the thrust of the
Twin City decision was subsequently reaffirmed in State ex rel.
Beery v. Houghton,40 which upheld the constitutionality of a provision of a comprehensive zoning ordinance excluding multiple
dwellings from a restricted residential district. After discussing
the Lachtman line of cases, the Beery court expressly overruled
previous Minnesota cases inconsistent with its decision. However, it will be recalled that the Lachtman court seemed to equate
restrictions designed to achieve more than the elimination of
nuisances with those founded on aesthetics. Since the Beery court
did not hold that zoning could be based upon purely aesthetic
considerations, its criticism of Lachtman did not necessarily contory of individual homes depreciates very much the values in the whole
territory. The loss is not only to the owners, but to the state and
municipality by reason of the diminished taxes resulting from diminished values.

. .

. It is time that courts recognized the aesthetic as a

factor in life. Beauty and fitness enhance values in public and private
structures. But it is not sufficient that the building is fit and proper,
standing alone, it should also fit in with surrounding structures to some
degree.
144 Minn. at 19-20, 176 N.W. at 162 (Holt, J.).
39.
The right to restrict under the police power without compensation
and to restrict by condemnation with compensation differ, but have
much in common. It is likely that many of the businesses and buildings
referred to in the statute [providing for condemnation] could be excluded under the police power.
144 Minn. at 17, 176 N.W. at 161. Also, the court recognized in State ex rel.
Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 148, 204 N.W. 569 (1925), aff'd, 273
U.S. 671 (1926), that members of the court and the profession had with some
justification regarded the Twin City case as having implications for land-use
planning under the police power as well as the power of eminent domain. The
Bedry court did nothing to dispell this notion.
40. 164 Minn. 146, 204 N.W. 569 (1925), aff'd, 273 U.S. 671 (1926), on the
authority of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The
Euclid decision was the first by the United States Supreme Court to uphold
the constitutionality of a comprehensive zoning ordinance.
One writer considers Beery highly significant in that it indicated a trend
to be rapidly followed by other state courts in reversing their earlier decisions
invalidating comprehensive zoning ordinances. I YoKUDY, op. cit. supra note
14, § 23.
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stitute an overruling of the statements contained in that case objecting to land-use restrictions founded on aesthetics. It may
have been saying implicitly that while the power to regulate landuse is broader than the power to control nuisance it does not encompass aesthetically motivated zoning. Nevertheless, Lachtman
is at best indecisive and weak authority as to the propriety of
restricting land-use to achieve aesthetic objectives. Consequently,
the dictum in Olsen should not be considered as resurrecting
Lachtman until the question is decided of necessity and upon
full consideration.
B.

DinuToN

IN PROPERTY VALuE

The Alexander court indicated that a spot or amendatory zoning ordinance which totally destroys or substantially diminishes
the value of property, without providing the owner just compensation therefor, involves a taking of property without due process.
It is generally agreed that the constitutional requirement that
just compensation be paid for private property taken for public
use is inapplicable to losses incurred as a result of governmental
regulation." However, uncertainty exists as to the proper means
to distinguish a taking of property from a regulation." A theory
frequently invoked by judges makes the decision turn upon the
extent to which governmental regulation diminishes property
value; an ordinance which deprives property of all beneficial use
is treated as a compensable taking.43
Assuming that the extent of diminution in property value is
the proper test for determining whether a zoning regulation constitutes a taking of property, it would seem that more than sub41. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964).
42. See generally Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing
Increased Community Costs an Suburban Residents Through Subdivision
Exactions, 73 YALE L. J. 1119, 1126-3o (1964); Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
43. See 8 McQumN § 25.44, at 103 and cases cited therein.
The Minnesota Supreme Court appeared to recognize this test in State
ex rel. Foster v. City of Minneapolis, 255 Minn. 249, 253, 97 N.W.2d 273,
276 (1959), 44 MIN. L. REV. 181 (1960).
The New York court has invalidated an ordinance as to particular
property where the owner was deprived of all its economic use for an unreasonably long time, Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 292,
15 N.E.2d 587 (1938), though the court might well have sustained the
ordinance had there been total deprivation for only a limited or reasonable
period.
One court has gone further and upheld a zoning ordinance even though,
in effect, it deprived a landowner of all economic use of his land without
compensation. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.
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stantial diminution in absolute terms would be required for a taking to occur. The owner of land worth $500,000 before the enactment of a regulation and $125,000 afterwards has surely lost more
than one whose land value declines from $100,000 to $10,000. Yet
equality of treatment in applying the diminution test would
seem to require a relative rather than an absolute measure of loss.
Even then the phrase "substantial diminution" is too vague to
admit of fair application. It would therefore seem that deprivation of all reasonable or beneficial use ought to be required to
classify the application of a regulation as a taking. Perhaps the
Alexander court meant to suggest this by its use of the phrase
"total destruction or substantial diminution." However, if it
meant to require only a partial reduction in value for the owner
to secure compensation," it would seem to be on untenable
ground in terms of both the practical line-drawing problem suggested above and recent decisional law. The mere fact that
a forbidden use would yield a greater return than does the permitted use does not mean that the owner has suffered a violation of
his constitutional rights.4" The United States Supreme Court recently intimated that if a regulation or ordinance is otherwise
valid, the fact that it deprives the subject property of most of its
2d 515, 370 P.2d 842, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
This has been criticized as in effect ignoring Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922), and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594 (1962). 50 CALIF. L. REV. 896, 899 (1962).
One commentator notes a tendency increasingly to require high standards
of proof of pecuniary hardship when a landowner, in applying for a variance,
asserts that a zoning ordinance, as applied to his property, deprives him of
a reasonable return thereon. PooLEY, op. cit. supra note 16, at 56. See generally HoRAcK & NOLAN, LAND USE CONTROLS 175-86 (1955); 2 RATHKOPF ch.
45; Dallstream & Hunt, Variations, Exceptions and Special Uses, 1954 U. ILL.
L.F. 213; Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 516 (1955).
44. The most recent Minnesota zoning decision, Filister v. City of 'Minneapolis, 133 N.W.2d 500 (1964), may portend a rejection of this rule. The
court states the issue before it as "whether, because of the topography of
plaintiffs' property, the zoning restrictions render it valueless and therefore
constitute a confiscatory and unconstitutional taking." Id. at 501. (Emphasis
added.) Further, in referring to cases including Alexander, the court said that
"none of the cases cited .. . deals squarely with a situation where real estate
has been deprived of all practical use by restrictive zoning under circumstances where surrounding property owners would be adversely affected by
holding the ordinance unconstitutional." Id. at 503. (Emphasis added.)
45. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 592 (1962); Weitling v. County of Du Page, 26 Ill. 2d 196, 186 N.E.2d 291 (1962); Filister v.
City of Minneapolis, supra note 44, at 502-03; Cohen v. Incorporated Village
of Valley Stream, 23 Misc. 2d 1017, 1023, 189 N.Y.S.2d 110, 117 (Sup. Ct.
1959.
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value does not render it unconstitutional.40 This would seem to reaffirm implications to be drawn from the landmark zoning case of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 4 7 where the Court upheld
the validity of a zoning ordinance as applied to property which
consequently suffered a 75 percent decline in value.
Furthermore, absent inquiry into the relationship of the ordinance or amendment to protection of the public health, safety, and
welfare, the statement in Alexander that a spot zoning ordinance
or an amendment to a comprehensive zoning ordinance, which
totally or substantially destroys property value, involves an unconstitutional deprivation of property is equally unfortunate.
Spot zoning is zoning not in accordance with a comprehensive
plan.4 It is invalid regardless of its effect upon the value of the
affected property.o An amendment of a comprehensive zoning
ordinance is usually authorized by the zoning enabling act and, insofar as valid, is designed to achieve the same objectives as the
original ordinance; thus it should be judged by the same standard
as is the comprehensive ordinance itself-' - whether it bears substantial relation to the public health, safety, or welfare. The factor
of diminution in property value should, therefore, be accorded no
greater weight than it is when considering the validity of the original ordinance.
C.

PURCHASE

OF PROPERTY WITH INTENT

To

USE IT AS ZONING

REGULATIONS THEN PERMIT

The Olsen and Alexander courts suggested that mere purchase
of property with intent to use it as zoning regulations then permit
is enough to immunize the property from subsequent zoning
46. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, supra note 45, at 592, 594.
47. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
48. Note, 13 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 375 (1952).
49. E.g., Zuckerman v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 160, 128
A.2d 325 (1956); 1 RATHKOPF 96-1.
50. See 1 RATHKOPF 26-5 n.10.
51. See Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91, 100, 96 N.E.2d 499, 504
(1951); Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N. J. 154, 173, 131 A.2d 1,
11 (1957).
One jurisdiction conditions the validity of an amendment upon a showing
of either a mistake in the original zoning or changes in circumstances. Hardesty v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 211 Md. 172, 177, 126 A.2d 621, 623 (1956).
A majority of jurisdictions have not ruled on this question. 1 RATHKOPF 2717. Some expressly disavow the Maryland view. Cohen v. City of Lynn,
333 Mass. 699, 132 N.B.2d 664 (1956); Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sands
Point, 6 App. Div. 2d 701, 174 N.Y.S.9d 283 (1958). See also I ANTIAu,
MuNiciPAL CoRPoRATIoN LAw § 7.15(2) (1964).
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changes. This is not consistent either with most authority elsewhere or with zoning theory. The interest of the community in
promoting the public welfare through the restriction of land-use
will inevitably conflict with the interests of individual landowners,
even where the regulation does not totally destroy property
values. From the beginning it has been sought to protect property
owners in certain of these cases through application of the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without
due process of law." The problem has been to determine when a
constitutionally recognized property right exists. While the zoning
of undeveloped land may involve a "taking of property" in the
sense that its owner is thereby deprived of the opportunity to develop it as he had originally anticipated,5 3 the courts have generally held that an unconstitutional deprivation of property occurs only where newly enacted zoning restrictions prohibit an
"existing" rather than an "intended" or "contemplated" use.14
This has been done in reliance upon the somewhat question-begging, though frequently reiterated, assertion that the owner of an
"existing use" has a "vested right" in the original ordinance."
As a result such a person is said to possess a "legal nonconforming
use,"' i.e., a use which is exempt from the ordinance unless com52. See Katarincic, Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses, Buildings, and
Structures by Amortization- Concept Versus Law, 2 DUQUESNE U.L. REV.
1, 20 (1963).
53. Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 308, 129 A.2d 363, 370
(1957); Moore, The Termination of Nonconforming Uses, 6 WH~iAMr AND
MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (1965).
54. E.g., O'Rourke v. Teeters, 63 Cal. App. 2d 349, 146 P.2d 983 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1944); Fairlawns Cemetery Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 138 Conn. 434,
86 A.2d 74 (1952); Talbot v. Myrtle Beach Bd. of Adjustment, 222 S.C. 165,
72 S.E.2d 66 (1952); see 1 ANTiEAu, op. cit. supra note 51, § 7.07; Anderson,
The Nonconforming Use-A Product of Euclidian Zoning, 10 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 214, 219 (1959).
55. "Courts are almost universally agreed that there are no vested rights
in a zoning ordinance. Nor is there a contract between the municipal corporation and property owners who purchase in reliance upon a municipal zoning
classification." 1 ANTIEAU, op. cit. supra note 51, § 7.15(3), at 480.
56. "The doctrine of vested non-conforming uses sprang from the reluctance of courts to give to zoning ordinances a retroactive effect which would
destroy substantial existing property rights . . . ." 2 RATHKOPF 58-1. The
term vested right is "but another way of saying that the property interest
affected by the particular ordinance is too substantial to justify its deprivation in light of the objectives to be achieved by enforcement of the provision." People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 108, 106 N.E.2d 34, 35 (1952). An official
local definition of the term "nonconforming use" can be found in Minneapolis, Minn., Zoning Ordinance, May 31, 1963, art. III, § B(84).
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pensation is paid for its elimination.57
The critical problem is to determine the elements of an existing
use. The courts generally have resolved the question by holding
that mere purchase of property with an intention to use it as then
permitted is insufficient;5" rather, substantial expenditures and/or
various degrees of construction undertaken in good faith reliance
on a building permit,5 9 or the likelihood that one will be is57. See 8 McQualm § 25.185; RnYN, MuNIcIPAL LAw § 82-26 (1957).
See generally Moore, The Termination of Nonconforming Uses, 6 WELTAm
"ND MARY L. REV. 1 (1965); Young, The Regulation and Removal of Nonconforming Uses, 12 W. REs. L. REv. 681 (1961).
58. See authorities cited in note 54 supra; 8 McQumLw § 25.188.
59. E.g., Asquino v. Tobriner, 298 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Nott v.
Wolff, 18 Ill. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809 (1960); Board of Supervisors v. Paaske,
250 Iowa 1293, 98 N.W.2d 827 (1959); Mayor of Baltimore v. Shapiro, 187
Md. 623, 51 A.2d 273 (1947); Bonan Realty Corp. v. Young, 16 Misc. 2d
119, 182 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Stowe v. Burke, 255 N.C. 527, 122
S.E.Qd 374 (1961); Lower Merion Township v. Frankel, 358 Pa. 430, 57
A.2d 900 (1948).
This is the rule in most jurisdictions. 1 ANTIEAU, op. cit. supra note 51,
§ 7.10; 8 McQuaLim § 25.157; 2 RATHKOPF ch. 57. § 3. Courts disagree as to
what is substantial construction and/or expenditures. See ibid. However,
since the object of the exception is to accommodate conflicting interests,
a court does not decide in vacuo. Each case must be decided upon its
circumstances, e.g., the type of project, its location, its ultimate cost, and the
amount expended or accomplished. See Board of Supervisors v. Paaske, supra;
Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio, 32 NJ. 448, 161 A.2d 241 (1960).
The Washington Supreme Court does not follow this rule. It holds that
a right to construct a building vests when the permit is applied for if the
permit is later issued, on the ground that this standard is more practical
to administer than the majority rule, which forces the court to inquire into
the moves and countermoves of the parties. Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125,
331 P.2d 856 (1958); State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash. 2d
492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954).
Courts disagree as to whether, under all circumstances, a permit must
have been issued, especially in cases of willful delay, or, as in Alexander,
unjustified refusal to issue a permit. See 2 RATHKOPF 57-8. It has been contended that no vested right can exist without the issuance of a permit because there is no opportunity to rely to one's detriment in its absence. Price
v. Schwafel, 92 Cal. App. 2d 77, 83, 206 P.2d 683, 687 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
For example, in Gramatan Hills Manor, Inc. v. Manganiello, 30 Misc. 2d
117, 213 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1961), it was held that the mere filing of
the application for a building permit conferred no right; New York law required a commencement of construction or the like before any vested right
accrued. Some courts, however, have said that vested rights exist if a permit
should have been issued. See Vine v. Zabriskie, 122 NJ.L. 4, 3 A.2d 886
(Sup. Ct. 1939); Dubow v. Ross, 175 Misc. 219, 22 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct.
1938). Under such an approach the plaintiff in Alexander arguably had a
vested right in the prior ordinance. It could reasonably be held that while
the making of substantial expenditures is ordinarily required, an exception
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sued,6 0 are required to immunize property from subsequently enacted zoning regulations."'
The selection of any step in the process of property improvement as the point at which a use is deemed to come into existence
may seem somewhat arbitrary.6 2 However, the criterion of substantial construction and/or expenditure in reliance on a permit
or on the probability that one will be issued appears reasonable
in light of one suggested rationale for excepting legal nonconforming uses from zoning regulations - to encourage or at least to
avoid discouraging the development or improvement of land in
which the public has a substantial interest." An obvious consideration militating in favor of a relatively limited scope of
exemption is that nonconforming uses vitiate the effectiveness of
the planning and zoning scheme; thus the spirit of zoning reto this rule will be made where invalid governmental action effectively prevents the owner from undertaking such expenditures. See Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. City of Park Ridge, 16 Ill. App. 2d 555, 566, 149 N.E.2d 344, 350
(1958); 49 Mumr. L. REv. 109 (1964).
60. The Illinois rule confers immunity where there are substantial expenditures in reliance upon the probability that a permit will issue. See Cos
Corp. v. City of Evanston, 27 Ill. 2d 570, 190 N.E.2d 364 (1963); Chicago
Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Palatine, 22 Ill. App. 2d 264, 160 N.E.2d
697 (1959). One authority indicates that this rule recognizes that permit
requirements can be so strict that even the application for a permit may
involve substantial expenditures. 2 RATHKOPF 57-10. For example, MNIEArous, Mmn., CODE OF ORDn;ANcEs § 11.010 (1960) (Building Code), entitled "Permit Procedure," requires the Sing of three complete sets of plans
and specifications, prepared and signed by a registered architect or registered
professional engineer, with a building permit application for a structure to
cost over $10,000, other than a single or two-family dwelling. Thus, although
excavation prior to issuance of a building permit is prohibited, compliance
with these requirements would normally entail some expenditures. The
plaintiff in Alexander prepared final plans for the foundation and preliminary
plans for the building itself. The foundation plan was approved but no
permit was issued due to the hold order. Record, p. 156, Alexander v. City
of Minneapolis, 267 Minn. 155, 125 N.W.2d 583 (1963).
61. The cases cited in Alexander, 267 Minn. at 160, 125 N.W.2d at 587,
do not provide support for the proposition that the purchase of property
creates immunity from future changes in zoning classification. For a capsule
presentation of the distinguishing features of these cases, see 49 Mm-. L.
REV. 109, 115 n.22 (1964).

62. See Note, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 323, 828 (1962).
68. See Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A
Case Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L. J. 273, 315 (1962); Comment, 26 U. Cr.
L. REV. 442, 452, 458 (1959); Note, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 103 (1953).
"[C]ourts are keenly sympathetic to persons who have invested in and
improved property in reliance upon a municipal zoning classification." 1
ANTIEAU, op. cit. supra note 51, § 7.15 (3), at 480. (Emphasis added.)
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quires that they be limited in number as much as is possible and
eliminated as rapidly as is fair. 4
Even the foregoing capsulized consideration of the role and
scope of the nonconforming use illustrates the significant departure from zoning theory and practice which would result if the
comments in Olsen and Alexander were construed to mean that
mere purchase of property with intent to use it as zoning regulations then permit is sufficient to immunize the property from
subsequent zoning changes. 65 All zoning regulations would be
invalid, since every change in classification, including enactment
of the initial ordinance, would affect the expectations held by
the then owner when he acquired the property. Thus, the efficacy
of the present system would be substantially diminished, if not
entirely destroyed. However, the most recent Minnesota case having any bearing on the question suggests that purchase and im§ 25.183; 2 RATHKoPF ch. 62.
65. It is possible that the Olsen court meant that issuance of a building
permit is sufficient to immunize the property from later zoning changes. This
could indicate acceptance of the Washington rule discussed in note 75 supra.
Reference to prior Minnesota cases is unhelpful since at most they are inconsistent and at least are unclear as to the degree of development necessary
to entitle property to the status of a nonconforming use. State ex rel. Berndt
v. Iten, 259 Minn. 77, 106 N.W.2d 366 (1960), and Kiges v. City of St.
Paul, 240 Minn. 522, 62 N.W.2d 363 (1953), indicate that the "substantial
expenditures view" may prevail in this state. Dicta in Olsen, Alexander, and
State ex rel. Foster v. City of Minneapolis, 255 Minn. 249, 97 N.W.2d 273
(1959), 44 Mum. L. REv. 181 (1960), however, cast doubt on this conclusion.
In Berndt, supra, the court said that Kiges, supra, "held that where a
building permit was acquired but construction proceeded no further than
excavation, no vested rights to use the premises for the purposes planned
existed which could not be cut off by a subsequent amendment of the
ordinance." 259 Minn. at 81, 106 N.W.ed at 369. The court in Berndt went
on to say with respect to its own facts:
[W]here a part of the property -constituting less than half of the
purchased prior to the submission of an
total consideration -was
official application for a permit and in reliance upon statements of
the village clerk and the village attorney; where an option to purchase
the balance of the property was not exercised until subsequent to a
denial of the application; and where no building permits were applied
for, nor actual construction begun, before the denial of the application,
no vested rights were acquired in the ordinance. . . .
Id. at 81-82, 106 N.W.2d at 369.
In Foster, supra, the court quoted from Leighton v. City of Minneapolis,
16 F. Supp. 101, 106 (D. Minn. 1936): "When zones are established, citizens
buy and improve property relying on the restrictions provided by law. They
have a right to the permanency and security that the law should afford."
255 Minn. at 253, 97 N.W.2d at 276. If emphasis is placed on the words,
"and improve," the statement is fully in accord with the view enunciated in
64. See 8 McQumiLLi

Kiges.
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provement of property may be required. 6 In any event, the uncertainty surrounding the status of Minnesota law on this important question clearly requires early explanation.

D.

THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE
FuNDINGS OF FACT

REVIEW

OF A TRIAL COURT'S

The Olsen court said that the trial judge's findings of fact relating to the validity of the city council's action upon the application for a special permit were entitled to the same weight as a
jury verdict. Criticism of this comment requires a background
discussion of judicial and administrative fact-finding and review
thereof.
There are generally considered to be two types of faets, adjudicative and legislative. The former relate to the events or occurrences in the particular case under judicial consideration.' Although the latter also occasionally bear a special relation to the
parties, they are used primarily to assist the court in deciding
questions of policy or law." In fact, every adjudication of the
The Olsen court noted:
While it is true that a number of courts have held that the issuance
of a permit to erect a structure for a permitted use under a zoning
ordinance does not create a vested right that cannot be cut off by
subsequent amendment . . . we feel that in justice the better rule
is to give full accord to the rights of property owners based upon interests therein arising out of comprehensive zoning ordinances.
263 Minn. at 12, 115 N.W.2d at 742. The court added that the Kiges case
had not determined whether plaintiff had vested rights under the prior comprehensive zoning ordinance. Id. n.2.
The comment by the Alexander court was: "Numerous courts have given
approval to the doctrine that where zones have been established in a municipality, and property has been purchased with intent to use it in conformance
with such zoning, the purchaser ordinarily has a right to so use it." 125
N.W.2d at 587. Read with the comment in Olsen, the implication exists
that purchase of property with intent to use it as then permitted is sufficient
to immunize the property from subsequent zoning changes; yet the cases
cited in Alexander fail to support this proposition. See note 61 supra.
66. In Filister v. City of Minneapolis, 183 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. 1964), the
court considered whether neighboring landowners had sufficiently relied upon
the classification of the subject property to prevent modification thereof. It
concluded that the owner of the subject property was guilty of laches in
failing to secure a zoning change before his neighbors had developed their
land in reliance upon the present classification of his.
67. 2 DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 15.03

(1958) [hereinafter

cited as DAvis]. See generally Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional
Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75.
68. 2 DAVIs § 15.03; Karst, supra note 67, at 77.
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constitutionality of legislation involves an explicit or implicit consideration of questions of legislative fact, since a function of the
court in such a case may be to determine whether or not the
legislative judgment is reasonable."
The scope of review of adjudicative facts generally depends
upon the identity of the fact-finder. Where the trier of fact is a
jury or an administrative body, the reviewing tribunal will usually defer to a finding of adjudicative fact if it is based upon
"substantial evidence" on the whole record,70 i.e., "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 7' A different rule prevails in Minnesota and
the federal courts where a judge is the fact-finder. Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 52(a) and Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
59.01 provide that in this situation "findings of fact shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, 72 and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."7 3
For several reasons broader appellate review is permitted under the "clearly erroneous" rule than the "substantial evidence"
69. See Karst, supra note 67, at 84-85; Bikle, Judicial Determination
of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative
Action, 38 HAnv. L. REV. 6 (1924).
70. See Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries:

A Comparative Analysis, 58 HEARv. L. RIv. 70, 73 (1944).
MInn. STAT. ANN. § 15.0425 (Supp. 1964) provides that a reviewing
court may reverse or modify the decision of an administrative agency if " (e)
Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted . . . ."

For a consideration of the question whether there are exceptions to the
substantial evidence standard for reviewing administrative determinations of
factual issues, see generally GEElHORn &BYSE, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw 472-92
(4th ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as GErLHoRN & BYSE].
71. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLXRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See
generally Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 HAnv. L. Rnv. 1283 (1951). The court is not concerned with the
weight of the evidence. Bvaus, ADwuNISTRATIVE LAw & LocAL GovERNMENT 30 (1963) [hereinafter cited as BuRRus]; Schwartz, The Administrative
Procedure Act in Operation, 29 N.Y.UL. REv. 1173, 1255 (1954).

72. "Clearly erroneous" describes the situation which arises "when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395

(1948).
73. See generally 2 YOUNGWQUIST & BLAcIK, MINNESOTA RULEs PRACTICE
648 (1953); WRIGHT, MINNESOTA RULEs 296-97 (1954). For a history of the
controversy over such appellate review of trial court decisions, see Clark &
Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. Cal. L. REv. 190 (1937).
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rule.7 4 When the jury is the trier of fact there is a limitation in
some cases on appellate review by virtue of the constitutional
guarantee of trial by jury." Further, one reason for leaving the
determination of questions of fact to juries is to elicit decisions
reflecting the underlying community sense of fairness.7 6 Finally,
since juries are ad hoc, there is an element of futility in continually reversing and remanding a jury verdict for a new trial; a new
jury would be selected and the process would merely begin anew.
The principal reasons for entrusting the determination of fact
to administrative bodies are to obtain the advantage of expertise
and the promotion of a defined legislative policy in judicial-type
proceedings.7 7 In view of these considerations substantial deference must generally be given the factual determinations of juries
and administrative bodies; as the scope of review becomes broader
the reasons for introducing a jury or agency into the fact-finding
process are frustrated. On the other hand, when the court is the
trier of fact, limitations upon the scope of appellate review are
justified only by the trial judge's opportunity to assess credibility
and the smoother judicial administration which will result from
making him the primary fact-finder."
74. See Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedure- The
American Bar Association Program, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 233
(1961); Gatchell, The Impact of the Administrative Process on the Judicial
Branch of the Government, 16 FED. B. J. 482, 487-88 (1956); Sellers, The
American Bar Association's Legislative Proposals Respecting Legal Services
and Procedures, 24 ICC PRAc. J. 1115, 1121 (1957).
Some commentators have argued that there is no practical difference
between the two. Cooper, Judicial Review, 80 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1375, 1380
(1955); Davis, Judicial Trends in the Review of Administrative Agency Decisions, 11 AD. L. BULL. 194, 195 (1958). The courts have regularly recognized
a distinction. W.R.B. Corp. v. Geer, 313 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1963); NLRB
v. Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.2d 244, 246 (4th Cir. 1952). However, "In the
last analysis . . . whatever the verbal formula, the crucial thing is the
attitude with which the reviewing judge approaches the question." HART,
AN INTRODUCTION To ADmtNISTRATIVE LAw 686 (2d ed. 1950).
75. See PoUn, APPEILATE PROCEDURE IN CIVL CASES 225 (1941).

76. Stern, supra note 70, at 81.
77. See GELLHORN & BYSE 481; Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact,
69 HARv. L. REv. 1020, 1055 (1955).
78. Brochin & Sandier, Appellate Review of Facts in New Jersey, Jury and
Non-Jury Cases, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 482, 489 (1958); Stem, supra note 70,
at 82; Tate, Further Observation on Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana
Civil Cases, 29 LA. L. REv. 605, 607-08 (1962).
It is noted in WRIGHT, MINNESOTA RurLs (Supp. 1956, at 64), that a
jury verdict and a fnding of fact by a trial court are not entitled to the
same weight in the eyes of an appellate court. Deference to the trial judge
is justified only by his ability to see and hear the witnesses, PoUND, op. cit.
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With respect to legislative facts, the scope of review afforded
the findings of a trial judge logically should depend upon whether
they are based on oral testimony, written memoranda, or merely
assumptions reflecting the judge's own experience and education." At least in the last instance there appears to be no reason
for appellate court deference except to the extent justified by administrative convenience, which would seem to vary inversely
with the importance of the fact in question. In addition the need
for uniform application of the law within a jurisdiction requires
that findings of legislative fact - as essential ingredients of rules
of law - be consistent throughout the trial courts within that
jurisdiction. If they are not, there might be as many different laws
as there are trial courts. Thus, if appellate courts could reverse
only those findings of legislative fact which are "unreasonable"
within the meaning of the substantial evidence test, their raison
d'etre would be largely frustrated.
In any event, the scope of review of a trial judge's findings of
legislative fact is at least as broad as that applicable to his findings of adjudicative fact. A fortiori, an appellate court should
defer less to a trial judge's findings of legislative fact than to a
jury verdict. It is clear, therefore, that whether the O1sen court
was referring to adjudicative or legislative facts, its statement
that the trial judge's findings of fact were entitled to the same
supra note 75, at 388, and a desire to secure smoother judicial administration.
One commentator, however, feels that deference to a trial judge's findings
because of his opportunity to judge credibility may often be unwarranted,
since the urban nature of much of our present society makes it unlikely that
the trial judge will know the witnesses and their reputations or idiosyncrasies,
as once may have been the case, and since demeanor alone allegedly does
not provide a fair basis for evaluating a witness' credibility. Hardy, The
Manifest ErrorRule, 21 LA. L. REv. 749, 752 (1961).
Another aspect of the "clearly erroneous" rule is its applicability to
documentary or undisputed evidence. See generally Note, 49 VA. L. Ruv. 506
(1963). One authority argues that the scope of review should be no greater
even where no credibility factor is involved, and asserts that this has long
been the rule in Minnesota. Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate
Courts,41 MNm. L. REv. 751, 764-66 (1957).
79. In Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548 (1924), the Supreme Court said that "the court may ascertain as it sees fit any fact that
is merely a ground for laying down a rule of law . ... "
Professor Davis notes that the practical difference between adjudicative
and legislative facts is that the latter "need not be, frequently are not, and
sometimes cannot be supported by evidence." 2 DAvis & 15.03. Another commentator has observed, however, that there is no real basis for assuming
that a trial judge's training and experience specially qualify him to determine
legislative facts unless evidence relating to those facts is developed in the
case. Bikle, supra note 68, at 6.
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weight as a jury verdict is at variance with both reason and authority, although admittedly supported by previous statements
of the Minnesota court.s0
E.

NuscE AND THE SPECIAL PERMIT

The Olsen court indicated that the City of Minneapolis could
not utilize the special permit device to prevent the landowner's
construction of a filling station on property where the comprehensive zoning ordinance permitted that use, unless the use would
constitute a nuisance."' Although there has been no exhaustive
analysis of the relation between regulation of land use through
the power to eliminate nuisance and through the zoning power, 2
certain things are clear. The exercise of the police power through
adoption of zoning ordinances does not depend upon the existence
of nuisance for its validity." In fact it was early noted that the
80. See, e.g., Gethsemane Lutheran Church v. Zacho, 258 Minn. 438, 104
N.W.2d 645 (1960); Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 94
N.W.2d 278 (1959); Nielson v. City of St. Paul, 252 Minn. 12, 88 N.W.2d
853 (1958).
81. 263 Minn. at 11, 115 N.W.2d at 741.
82. Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance
Cases, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 440, 452.
83. See Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 552, 254 P.2d
865 (1958); Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930);
BASSETT, ZONING 93 (1940); Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41
CoLuM. L. REv. 457 (1941); Comment, 54 Mcon. L. REv. 266 (1955). This
was early recognized. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 387-88 (1926); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 487, 234
Pac. 381, 384 (1925).
Especially during the early years of zoning law, when the regulations
were very unsophisticated and not unlike nuisance regulations, it was natural
for courts to use the concept of nuisance by analogy in passing on the
validity of zoning regulations. See Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25
CORNELL L.Q. 1, 14 (1939). However, it is clear that nuisance law is concerned
with unwarranted interference with another's use or enjoyment of his property, whereas zoning is concerned with land use regulation, whether or not
a use falls within the nuisance category. As was stated in an early Illinois
zoning decision:
The exclusion of places of business from residential districts is not
a declaration that such places are nuisances or that they are to be
suppressed as such, but it is a part of the general plan by which the
city's territory is allotted to different uses in order to prevent, or at
least to reduce, the congestion, disorder and dangers which often
inhere in unregulated municipal development.
City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 95, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (1925). The
above was quoted with approval in the Euclid decision. Supra at 392-93. See
generally Kurtz, The Effect of Land Use Legislation on the Common Law
of Nuisance in Urban Areas, 36 DICTA 414 (1959); Comment, 29 FoRDHAnM
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inadequacy of nuisance law gave rise to the need for zoning,"
under which uses beneficial and entirely harmless in the ordinary
sense may be barred from certain areas. Although comprehensive
zoning may well have evolved from a form of nuisance control,
it is presently a tool for land use planning. 5
The statement in Olsen lends itself to several alternative interpretations. Taken on its face, it would seem to nullify the special
permit device as a means of planning land use, since nuisance may
be regulated by a municipality which possesses no zoning authority. However, the peculiar facts involved in Olsen suggest a
narrower construction. The Minneapolis Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance of 1924 permitted the use of property within commercial zones for gasoline filling stations. 6 Seven months after enactment of the zoning ordinance, another ordinance was passed
requiring the acquisition of a special permit from the Council as
a condition for the construction of a filling station. However, the
zoning enabling act for first class cities specifies procedures to be
followed in amending a comprehensive zoning ordinance which
were not followed in the enactment of the special permit ordinance.8 7 Thus, if the Olsen court felt that the use of special permits could be authorized only by the zoning ordinance or an
amendment thereto, it may have concluded that Minneapolis' special permit ordinance was invalid. If so, it might reasonably be
concluded that Minneapolis could have properly used the special
permit device only as a means for exercising the municipality's
common law power to control nuisance.
The above construction may be a reasonable interpretation of
the enabling act as it existed in 1924, when the special permit
device under which the city acted in Olsen was enacted. However,
a 1953 amendment to the enabling act relating to special permit
devices referred to them as being adopted "by any local rule or
ordinance."" Arguably this amendment is significant for several
L. REV. 749 (1961); Note, 17 VA. L. REv. 202 (1930); Comment, 39 YALE

L.J. 735 (1930).
84. Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARv. L. REV. 834, 841
(1924).
85. See WALKER, op. cit. supra note 36, at 57, 103; Cribbet, Changing
Concepts in the Law of Land Use, 50 IowA L. REV. 245, 259-60 (1965).
86. MnmEAPOLIs, Mum., ORDWANCs 1:31-5 (1959).
87. Brief of Respondent, p. 12, Olsen v. City of Minneapolis, 263 Minn.
1, 115 N.W.2d 734 (1962).
88. Mum'. STAT. § 462.18 (1961), provides in part (Emphasis added.):
In any such city in which by any local rule or ordinance the use of
any land, or the construction or use of any building located within a
zoned district, shall have been made conditional upon the applying
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reasons. First, since it was incorporated into a zoning enabling act,
it seems to reflect legislative recognition of the special permit
device as a tool of zoning rather than nuisance control. Second,
since it does not authorize the use of the special permit device,
but assumes its existence, it may support the view that the use of
special permits is impliedly authorized by the zoning enabling
act." Third, the reference to "any local rule or ordinance" would
seem to reflect a legislative assumption that a special permit
device need not be adopted as an amendment to the comprehensive zoning ordinance.
Assuming the reasoning above to be sound, the result in Olsen
ought not to have been founded upon the failure of the city to
allege or prove that the proposed filling station would constitute
a nuisance. It should have been justified instead on the failure of
the city council to state in writing its reasons for denying the
permit,9 0 as required by statute."' The court's statement that the
city had failed to make a finding that the proposed use would
be a nuisance may reflect a partial application of this statute.
Ill. THE INADEQUATELY EXPRESSED FACTORS
It has been said with respect to modern municipalities that
"planning for flexibility to meet the changing pattern of tomorrow
is a must in this age of accelerated change."92 Though the final
responsibility for properly channeling such flexibility rests upon
the legislature, a considerable burden rests upon the judiciary, one
of whose traditional functions has been to serve as a brake upon
abuses and excesses arising from the exercise of governmental
power. 3 Neither municipality nor judiciary can satisfactorily fulfill these functions without recognizing the proper role of the
other. Respect for and cooperation with each other may go far
toward achieving a workable zoning system which does not produce unfair loss to the individual property owner.
for and obtaining the governing body's consent thereto, no such
application shall be denied except by action of the city council in
writing adopted by the governing body after a public hearing on such
application, which denial -shall state the reasons for such denial.
89. Cf., Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 Ill. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601
(1960).
90. Brief of Respondent, p. 28, Olsen v. City of Minneapolis, 268 Minn.
1, 115 N.W.2d 784 (1962).
91. See note 88 supra.
92. Windsor, The Planning, Platting, and Developing of an Industrial
District,I INSTITUTE ON PLANNING AND ZONING 79, 83 (1960).
93. U.S. ATToRNEY GENERAL'S CoiMI. ON ADmNsTRATiVn PNocEunRE,
FINAL REPORT 77 (1941).
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It is submitted that each of the three cases discussed in Part
I of this Note involved a somewhat misunderstood and unarticulated clash between a municipal attempt to achieve a measure
of zoning flexibility and a countervailing judicial effort to restrict
the desired freedom. In Olsen and Golden, the municipality had
sought to accomplish flexibility by conditioning particular uses
of property upon the acquisition of special permits from the local
governing body. In acting upon permit requests this body performed an administrative rather than a legislative function, since
it applied a previously enacted zoning ordinance to particular
cases." Consequently limitations ought to have been placed
upon its exercise of discretion. In neither Olsen nor Golden was
this done adequately. In the third case, Alexander, the flexibility
device involved was a hold order without express limitation as
to time or provision for reasonable use.
Neither of these flexibility devices is really new, though both
may often have been misunderstood. Attention is now turned to
the desirable if not essential restrictions on their use, since the
absence of such restrictions may or at least should have been the
court's major concern in each case.

A.

Tm

SPECIAL PERMIT

This much-discussed95 and frequently misunderstood flexibility device goes by various names in different areas: special
exception permit, conditional use permit, special use permit. 6
Regardless of name the assumption underlying its application is
that while certain uses may generally be compatible with others,
their compatibility in any particular case depends upon sur94. See note 118 infra and accompanying text.
95. The following list is not intended to be exhaustive: 2 RATHKOPF ch.

54; Arnebergh, The Functions and Duties of a Board of Zoning Adjustment,
1 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING AND ZONING 109-15 (1960); Crawford, Special
Exceptions Prove To Be the Rule, 26 CoN. B.J. 172 (1952); Cunningham,
State and Local Programs, 50 IowA L. REv. 367,
Land-Use Control-The

399-405 (1965); Gaylord, Zoning: Variances, Exceptions and Conditional Use
Permits in California, 5 U.CJL.AL. REV. 179 (1958); Green, Are "Special
Use" Proceduresin Trouble? 12 ZONING DIGEST 78 (1960); Greenberg, Zoning

in Connecticut-Substantive Standardsfor Variances, Special Exceptions, and
Amendments, 29 CoNN. B.J. 103 (1955); Reps, Legal and Administrative
Aspects of Conditional Zoning Variances and Exceptions, 2 SYRACUSE L. REV.
54 (1950); Strine, The Use of Conditions in Land-Use Control, 67 DICK. L.
REv. 109, 112-15 (1963); Van Dusen, The Special Exception and the Burden
of Proof, 25 PA. B.A.Q. 154 (1954).
96. HAGMAN, WISCONSIN ZONING PRAcTICE 7, 51 (1962); 2 RATHKOPF

54-1 n.1.
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rounding circumstances. 7 That is not to say, however, that the
determination of each case is to be entirely at large. Although
unique characteristics may make it virtually impossible to authorize such a use generally within a particular zone, many of the circumstances which would make it incompatible with its surroundings can be anticipated. Criteria or standards to assist in making
the particularized determination may be derived from a consideration of those circumstances. Since the desirability, if not necessity,
of such criteria or standards is central to the special permit problem, some consideration of their origin and purpose will be helpful.
One means of achieving adherence to standards may be to
require administrative bodies to support their decisions with findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in a reasoned opinion; some attention will be given the possibility of requiring that
such an opinion accompany any action taken upon an application for a special permit. Brief reference will also be made to recent Illinois experience in applying standards and findings requirements to the administration of certain zoning flexibility devices. Finally, the role which these requirements might and/or
should have played in the decision of Olsen and Golden, the two
subject cases involving denial of special permits, will be discussed.

1.

Standards

Though it was thought at one time that there could be no delegation of federal legislative power, 8 this inflexible and unrealistic
view has been progressively liberalized by the courts to enable
the federal government to cope with the increasingly complex
problems of our age." The currently prevailing theory is that a
97. E.g., Tullo v. Milburn Township, 54 N.J. Super. 483, 490-91, 149
A.2d 620, 624-25 (App. Div. 1959); National Maritime Union v. City of
Norfolk, 202 Va. 672, 678, 119 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1961); see RAGMAN, op. cit.
supra note 96, at 8, 51; 2 RATHKOPF (Supp. 1964, at 54-18); Reps, supra note
95, at 61.
98. The history of this theory and its implications for governmental
activity are critically discussed in Duff & Whitside, Delegata Potestas Non
Potest Delegari* A Maxim of Ameican Constitutional Law, 14 CoRNELL
L.Q. 168 (1928). An earlier article offering an explanation of the theory and
its limitations is Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 YAx
L.J. 892 (1918). For an example of early judicial treatment of the problem
see Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
99. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLI AND ITs GovERNrMNT 77-78 (1930). For
evidence of the trend, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 Fed. 307, 312
(7th Cir. 1919).
In discussing the dilemma posed by the confrontation of the doctrine of
nondelegation and the ever-increasing need for flexibility, Professor Schwartz
illustrates the courts' solution by borrowing Professor Cushman's "syllogism":
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valid delegation of power must contain standards adequate to
channel its exercise.100 Yet the requirement of adequate standards
at the federal level is of limited significance; it appears to be "more
a matter of form than substance."' 0 Only rarely has the United
States Supreme Court invalidated a congressional delegation on
the ground of inadequate standards,1 02 though many cases involve
standards which are very general at best.0 s
If, as has been generally assumed, the delegation doctrine developed by the federal courts is premised largely upon the separation of powers of the national government required by the federal
constitution, the doctrine would not, without more, be applicable
to the states.'04 However, most state constitutions also provide
for a separation of powers;' 0 5 hence the doctrine is generally applicable at the state level. But, unlike the federal rule, the standards requirement is far from dead in the states. 0 There are sevMajor premise: Legislative power cannot be constitutionally delegated
by Congress.
Minor premise: It is essential that certain powers be delegated to
administrative officers and regulatory commissions.
Conclusion: Therefore the powers thus delegated are not legislative
powers.
ScHwARTz, AN INTRODUCTION To AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 32 (1958).
Even recently, state courts have often used language to the effect that if
the power delegated is adequately limited by standards it is not legislative.
E.g., Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 89 N.W.2d 635 (1958); Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 36 N.W.2d 530 (1949).
100. See e.g., United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 282 U.S.
311, 824 (1931); J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394
(1928); 1 DAvis ch. 2.
101. SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 99, at 42.
102. See AL.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); GELLHORN & BYSE 94.
103. Cases decided later than those noted in note 102 supra seem to
dilute the standards requirement considerably. See, e.g., Lichter v. United
States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944);
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 819 U.S. 190, 216 (1943). There
has been growing dissatisfaction in some quarters with this trend. See
generally Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for
Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REv. 863, 1055, 1263 (1962);
Miller, "Malaise in the Administrative Scheme": Some Observations on
Judge Friendly's Call for Better Definition of Standards, 9 How. LJ. 68
(1963).
104. The states are not required by the federal constitution to heed in
their internal organization the separation of powers doctrine. Consolidated
Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908).
105. E.g., MIN. CoNST. art. I, § 1; see Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103

U.S. 168, 190-91 (1880); BuRRus 32.
106. Buus 3; 1 DAvis § 2.07; Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative
Lao, 51 MICH. L. REv. 775, 782 (1953).
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eral possible reasons for this. An alternative means of channeling
the exercise of administrative discretion at the federal level continuous legislative oversight by subcommittees or standing
"watchdog" committees - is available only to a very limited
extent, if at all, at the state level.' 0 7 Moreover, procedural safeguards protecting the citizen affected by administrative action
are available to a lesser extent at the state than the federal
level.' Finally, it is sometimes intimated, if not asserted, that
state administrative bodies are usually more susceptible to control by interest groups than are their federal counterparts. 09
Local government is said to be the great exception to the
American system of trifurcated authority;"x0 municipal officials
supposedly may be invested with any desired combination of
executive, legislative, and judicial powers,"' though this would
doubtless depend upon individual state statutory and constitutional provisions. Therefore, if the constitutional necessity for
standards to govern the exercise of delegated power is based upon
the separation of powers,112 it is arguable that they are unnecessary in zoning administration at the local level. However, commentators have claimed it to be well settled that a valid delegation of power by a zoning ordinance to an administrative body
must be circumscribed by reasonably ascertainable standards."3
Two alternative explanations for this policy are available. It may
As to Minnesota cases, see, e.g., Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways,
267 Minn. 308, 126 N.W.2d 778 (1964); Visima v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177,
89 N.W.2d 635 (1958).
107. These devices are more readily available and have been widely
used at the federal level because Congress is in session every year. GELLHORN
& BYSE 169-80.
108. The Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 287 (1946), 5 U.S.C. H§
1001-11 (1958), is generally applicable at the federal level. However, not
all states have legislation similar to the APA, and those that do frequently
BsE
Y& 1281. See generally
offer less comprehensive protection. GEaHORN
HEADY, ADmiNISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LEGISLATION IN THE STATES (1952).
109. See Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 Couni.
L. REv. 359, 561, 584, 586 (1947).
110. E.g., State ex rel. Simpson v. City of Mankato, 117 Minn. 458, 186
N.W. 264 (1912).
Ill. I YoKLEy, MuNIcnPAL CoRPoRATIoNs § 74, at 179 (1956); see Note,
18 IND. LJ. 146 (1943).
112. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
113. Bunus 102, 104; Craig, Particularized Zoning: Alterations While
You Wait, 1 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING AND ZoNING 158, 167 (1960). Another
writer has said that the courts are now demanding the use of more definite
standards in special permit or special exception cases than has been the
case in the past. Reps, supra note 95, at 71.
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be strongly contended that, irrespective of whether there exists a
separation of local governmental powers, the due process clause
requires that an official or body acting in an administrative capacity be guided by standards to encourage similar application of
the law to similar fact situations." 4
However the constitutional issue is resolved, the practical reasons for requiring the use of standards in local zoning administration - drafted as specifically as possible" and set forth in the
special permit ordinance"' - are even more compelling than is
the case at the state level. Local administrative practices receive
very little attention or publicity in comparison with those at
higher levels of government,"T and usually are not subject to general procedural regulation."" Further, when the administrative
decision is rendered by the local legislative body itself, legislative
oversight is lacking. Local administrative bodies are also subject
to little, if any, political responsibility in this type of situation;
the electorate is usually unaware of proceedings directly affecting
only one or a few of its number. Thus properly drafted standards
may help prevent discrimination and abuse of discretion by
affording the judiciary a basis for review."" At the same time
they may aid and guide the administrative body itself.120 Furthermore, they give the persons who may be affected by discretionary
administrative action a basis for predicting the circumstances in
which various powers will be exercised.121
Some commentators feel that the need for specific standards is
lessened where the municipal governing body itself makes the
114. See North Bay Village v. Blackwell, 88 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 1956);
Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, 344 Mich. 693, 700, 75 N.W.2d 25, 28
(1956); Taylor v. Moore, 803 Pa. 469, 479, 154 Ad. 799, 802 (1931).
115. Reps, supra note 95, at 72.
116. See cases cited in note 97 supra, and note 124 infra.
117. BuRRus 123.
118. Buamus 105; see note 141 infra.
119. See PooLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 72
(1961); Craig, supra note 113, at 169, 170; Mandelker, Delegation of Power
and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 60; 14 STAN. L.
REv. 372, 378 (1962). See also Haar, "In Accordance With a Comprehensive
Plan," 68 HARv. L. REv. 1154, 1158, 1173 (1955).
120. 14 STAw. L. REv. 372, 378 (1962). See also PooLEY, op. cit. supra
note 119, at 10.
Even at the federal level, where the standards requirement is dying,
writers who have been administrators indicate that administrators often
refer to the standards which are given. LANDIs, THE ADMINIsTRATIVE PRocEss
67 (1938); Newman, The Literature of Administrative Law and the New
Davis Treatise, 43 MINN. L. REV. 637, 641-43 (1959).
121. See Greenberg, supra note 95.
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particularized determination.m Though judicial authority is
split, 2 3 most recent decisions seem to have considered that a
governing body acts in an administrative capacity when it makes
particularized, case-by-case zoning determinations and consequently have required such bodies to formulate and adhere to
standards.'2 4 This view would seem to be the better one.m2-s The
desirability or necessity of standards usually should depend not
upon governmental structure - the identity of the body exercising the power - but upon the function which that body performs. 2 6 Experience indicates that some curb on discretion is
necessary where the local legislative body is making particularized zoning determinations, if indeed it should perform such
functions at all. 27
122. Goldston & Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Developments,
78 HARv. L. REv. 241, 255-56 (1959).
123. 2 RATHKOPF 54-31.
124. See e.g., Wheeler v. Greeg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 203 P.2d 37 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1949); North Bay Village v. Blackwell, 88 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1956);
Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, 344 Mich. 693, 75 N.W.2d 25 (1956); State
ex rel. Ludlow v. Guffey, 306 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1957); Phillips v. Borough
of E. Paterson, 134 N.J.L. 161, 46 A.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1946). But see Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 Ill. 2d 181, 187, 166 N.E.2d 601, 605 (1960);
Shell Oil Co. v. Farrington, 19 App. Div. 2d 555, 241 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1963).
See also State ex rel. Greenberg v. Dade County, 120 So. 2d 625 (Fla. App.
1960) (licensing ordinance); Gaudet v. Economical Super Mkt., Inc., 112
So. 9d 720 (La. 1959).
[T]here now seems to be little doubt that a zoning ordinance must
prescribe definite standards for the guidance and control of the building inspector, the zoning officials and indeed the municipal council,
when by the ordinance it reserves to itself various administrative
zoning powers. An ordinance whereby the city council delegates to
itself the arbitrary and unfettered authority to decide where and how
a particular structure shall be built or where located without at the
same time setting up reasonable standards which would be applicable
alike to all property owners similarly conditioned, cannot be permitted
to stand as a valid municipal enactment.
North Bay Village v. Blackwell, supra at 526.
125. See 2 METZENBAUM, ZONING 1649 (2d ed. 1955). See also 2 RATHKOPF 63-7.
126. See Bunaus 108; Mandelker, supra note 119, at 85, 86.
127. The impact of improper political pressure upon zoning is not unknown. See 2700 Irving Park Bldg. Corp. v. Chicago, 395 Ill. 138, 150, 69
N.E.2d 827, 833 (1946), 14 U. Cal. L. REV. 718, 721 (1947). In fact a common objection to zoning flexibility devices is that their administration is
subject to pressures of money, power, and friendship. See Haar & Hering,
The Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning or an Inflexible
Judiciary?, 74 HAnv. L. Rav. 1552, 1565 (1961). One writer asserts that the
abuse of power by planning commissions and boards of zoning appeals is
due mainly to "their susceptibility to local influence and pressure groups."
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In considering whether standards should be required even if
not constitutionally dictated, the question is not whether to
guard against arbitrariness, but how best to do so. Professor
Davis concedes that definite standards can provide some protection against favoritism and discrimination, but argues that other
methods are likely to be superior.128 It is true that "mere lanNote, 30 IND. L.J. 521, 530 (1955). Other commentators, however, have
argued that abuse of power "is less likely to come from the board [of zoning
appeals] than from the city council," since political pressure is more likely
to be brought to bear successfully on the latter. Dallstream & Hunt, Variations, Exceptions and Special Uses, 1954 U. IL. L.F. 218, 240.
Whether or not the legislative body acting in an administrative capacity
does decide the problems before it in light of improper political considerations, the members of the public who are aware of the decisions may think
that they are influenced by politics. "[T]hat the public believe justice is done
is no less important than that it be done . . . ." Pound, Justice According

to Law, 13 CoLuu. L. REv. 696, 701-02 (1913). Thus it might be wise not to
have the local legislature apply the policy decisions it has reached in a zoning
ordinance, but to delegate the responsibility to an administrative body and
to limit its exercisable discretion by imposing standards and requiring that
it make written findings of fact and develop the reasons for its conclusion
in each case.
The susceptibility of municipal councils to political influence may even
have implications for the scope of judicial review of zoning ordinances:
The rationale behind the presumption of validity generally is that
the political processes are adequate to assure representation of affected
interests in the legislature and that, therefore, the court should not
"substitute its judgment" for that of the democratically chosen and
responsible body.
Mishkin, Are the Established Legal Principles of Zoning Valid and Adequate
for Current Conditions of Rapid Metropolitan Growth and Urban Re-

development?, Municipal L. Service Letter, Jan. 1960, p. S. See also Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts,48 Mm. L. REv. 643, 705 (1964).
Professor Mishkin contends that in view of the pressures inevitably involved in the enactment of a zoning ordinance, local political processes "cannot be relied upon to ensure representation of those interests which are in
fact being affected by the legislation. Under such circumstances, a greater
judicial role is called for in reviewing the legislative action; there is less reason
for an automatic 'presumption of validity."' Mishkin, supra p. 3. He would
retain the presumption as to any governmental unit large enough to "carry
a circumstantial guarantee of representation of affected interests." Id. p. 4.
This is contrary to the traditional view that the presumption applies
with equal strength at all levels. See Pacific States Box &Basket Co. v. White,
296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935). See also New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. City
of New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682, 686 (1930); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of
Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 71, 141 A.2d 851, 856 (1958).
128.
When findings [of fact] ... are required and made, the chances of
favoritism are much reduced. The protection that comes from a hear-
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guage cannot provide the stabilizing element . . . .""2 Adequate

standards and even a public hearing are of limited value to both
the landowner and the reviewing court if the body exercising
discretion is not required to make findings of fact and provide
other than conclusory reasons to justify its decision. However,
to say that standards alone are inadequate to curb arbitrariness
is not to say that we should dispense with them. It means simply that they should be complemented by other safeguards. 3 0
Findings alone are unhelpful in the absence of sufficiently specific
standards to isolate the relevant facts.''
2.

Findings and Reasons

The significance of findings and a reasoned opinion in achieving effective limitation upon the exercise of discretion makes it
important to consider the desirability, if not necessity, of requiring their use in zoning administration proceedings. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act requires in certain cases that
an administrative agency's decision become part of the record
and include a statement of the findings of fact, conclusions of
law and reasoning upon which it is based."' Many state statutes
ing with a determination on the record, from specific findings and reasons, from opportunity for outside critics to compare one case with
another, from critical supervision by the legislative authority of the
city or state, and from judicial review -all this is likely to be superior
to protection afforded by definiteness of standards.
1 DAvis § 2.09, at 111. Davis further notes that requiring definite standards
may produce excessive inflexibility. Ibid.
In Warren v. Marion County, 222 Ore. 307, 353 P.2d 257 (1960), the
Oregon court expressly adopted Professor Davis' view and held that the state
legislature need not prescribe standards when delegating power if adequate
safeguards were provided against arbitrary administrative action. This case
is roundly criticized in 14 STAN. L. REv. s72 (1962).
129. Mandelker, supra note 119, at 97.
130.
Without any policies, standards, or rules to guide the [Zoning] Board's
decisions, and without any requirement that the Board justify its
actlons by an opinion, the possibilities of arbitrary use of power are
great .

. .

. [Niot only the petitioners but also the public .

.

. have a

right to expect, as part of the basic administrative process, that discretionary exceptions will be decided by something more than the
individual preferences of Board members and with regard to the public
interest.

Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in
Misrule, 50 KY. L.J. 273, 309 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
131. See Crawford, supra note 95, at 181-82; Mandelker, supra note 119,
at 78.
132. APA §8(b), 60 Stat. 287 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952).
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contain similar requirements. 33 Usually, these statutes simply
codify prior, judicially-imposed requirements,1' as was the case
at the federal level.1'3 Though they do not require that findings
be set out in the formal manner to which trial judges are accustomed, 130 they are enforced more rigorously by the courts than
are the requirements imposed upon trial judges.' 7 Though arguably somewhat burdensome,s3 8 they are generally conceded to be
salutary.s30
Some commentators insist that procedural due process does
not require administrative agencies to make findings.4 o Others
argue that while this may be true at the federal level, there are
practical reasons for distinguishing local zoning bodies. 1 ' In any
133. HEADY, op. cit. supra note 108, at 88. The Model State Administrative
Procedure Act § 11 does not require the inclusion of reasons for the decision.
This is typical of the state acts. HEADY, op. cit. supra note 108, at 88; see
GELLHORN & BYSE 1130-31 n.2. But MmN. STAT. ANN. § 15.0422 (Supp. 1964)
(Emphasis added.) provides:
Every decision and order adverse to a party of the proceeding
rendered by an agency in a contested case, shall be in writing or stated
in the record and shall be accompanied by a statement of the reasons
therefor. The statement of reasons shall consist of a concise statement
of the conclusions upon each contested issue of fact necessary to the
decision.
134. GELTHORN & BYSE 1131.
135. 2 DAvis § 16.02.
136. Timberg, Administrative Findings of Fact (pt. 2), 27 WASH. U.L.Q.
169, 177 (1942).
137. 2 DAvis § 16.01. It has been suggested that the difference in enforcement policies arises from the consciousness of the appellate courts that they
possess a relatively restricted scope of review of administrative findings of fact.
2 DAVIs § 16.05, at 446-47. See notes 70-74 supra and accompanying text.
For a contention that trial judges should not have to make findings of
fact if they give the reasons for their decisions, see Hanson, Findings of Fact
and Conclusionsof Law, 32 A.B.AJ. 52 (1946).
138. Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IowA L.
REv. 196, 207 (1948).
139. See HEADY, op. cit. supra note 108, at 88; Feller, Prospectus for the
Further Study of Federal Administrative Law, 47 YALE LJ. 647, 666 (1938);
Harris, Administrative Practice and Procedure:Comparative State Legislation,
6 OKLA. L. REv. 29, 51 (1953); Stason, supra note 138, at 207.
140. 2 DAVIs § 16.04; MAGAw, LEGAL ASPECTS oF ADMINISTRATIvE HEARINGS AND FINDINGS 18, 20 (1939).
141. Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 130, at 332:
[W]e are not entirely convinced that no stricter guarantees of due
process should be required of local zoning boards than are required of
federal agencies and courts. Members of the zoning board of adjustment
usually lack both the law-conditioning of judges and the expertise of
federal administrators. They are subject to great pressure from people
whom they know personally and with whom they do business - pres-
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event, there are reasons for requiring findings which seem particularly compelling at the local level.'" Thus, carefully drawn findings may induce a sense of responsibility on the part of the person
drafting them'" which will help to prevent arbitrary or careless
action;14 4 may facilitate judicial review, especially where there are
multiple and complex issues; 4 5 may prevent inadvertent judicial
usurpation of administrative functions by facilitating adherence
to a narrow scope of review; 4 " and may assist in the formulation
of decision and the preparation of cases for rehearing or review. 47
Consequently, a court would have ample justification for holding
that local administrative agencies are required by the due process
clause to make findings. 48
Reasons relate to discretion, law, and policy, as opposed to
fact. 4" Although reasoned opinions may not be required by due
sure which evidence shows they cannot resist half so effectively as
independent and salaried judges and federal administrators. Proceedings before a zoning board are ordinarily ex parte, with no high-priced
expert counsel representing the petitioner and with no adversary ready
to appeal any misapplication of law. And unlike federal agencies that
deal with cases of great national interest, zoning boards have not come
under the scrutiny of administrative law experts, legislative committees,
and newspaper reporters. Thus many of the factors which combine
to steady judicial and federal administrative decisions even without
findings, reasons, or opinions are missing.
142. "The validity of such requirement is sufficiently sustained in practical considerations and we need not inquire too closely for a constitutional
basis." Delaware, L. & W. Ry. v. City of Hoboken, 10 NJ. 418, 426, 91 A.2d
789, 742 (1952); see Feller, supra note 189, at 666.
Professor Davis asserts that "the practical reasons for requiring administrative findings are so powerful that the requirement has been imposed with remarkable uniformity by virtually all federal and state courts, irrespective of
a statutory requirement." 2 DAvIs § 16.05, at 444.
148. United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 694 (1942); Feller,sapranote 189, at 666.
144. 2 DAvis § 16.05, at 444, 446.
145. Professor Davis notes that this is the reason most often discussed
by the courts. 2 DAvis §16.05, at 444. Two other commentators feel that, as
to zoning boards of appeal, infrequent appeals make this reason much less
compelling than the necessity of findings to develop a body of precedent and
curb discriminatory or arbitrary administration. Dukeminier & Stapleton,
spra note 180, at 881.
146. 2 DAVIs § 16.04, at 445.
147. Id. 16.04, at 444; Feller, mpra note 189, at 666.
148. Most states have no statutory requirement applicable to zoning administration at the local level. Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 130, at 882.
In such jurisdictions the courts generally have not required findings except
as a basis for review on appeal. Ibid.
149. 2 DAvis § 16.12, at 476; GEaoN &BES 1156.
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process, they are highly desirable.5 0 Like findings, they help prevent the careless or arbitrary use of discretion. By providing a
body of precedent, they facilitate the case-by-case development
of standards where the subject matter makes it difficult to formulate them in advance.' 5 ' This would be particularly valuable when
dealing with special permits since they are used with respect to
uses whose proper placement in the community is by definition
uncertain. Moreover, it would seem that a statement of sound
reasons would increase judicial respect for the decision and make
it less susceptible to successful appeal' 52
The primary objection to requiring a statement of reasons
seems to be the time necessarily involved in preparing them.5 s
This argument is probably equally applicable to findings of fact.
Yet mental, if not written, compliance with both functions is
necessary if proper decisions are to be reached. Moreover, the
degree of formality with which findings of fact and reasons ought
to be rendered will depend upon the particular situation under
consideration.'" As to zoning administration, it has been suggested that a stenographic transcript of an oral decision and
statement of reasons might suffice and, if not, that the responsibility for decision should be given to a body possessing the time
required to prepare the necessary opinion.a55

8.

The Illinois Experience

Recent Illinois experience illustrates the application of standards and reasoning requirements to proceedings involving the
use of some zoning flexibility devices. The relatively new Illinois
Municipal Code requires that every variation granted from the
terms of a zoning ordinance be accompanied by findings of fact
specifying the reason or reasons supporting it. 5 6 A recent Illinois

decision, InternationalHarvester Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,5 7
suggests that such limitations on administrative discretion might
also have been initiated by the judiciary. The court said in strong
dicta, if it did not hold, that even though not required to do so

150. Bunnes 67; 2 DAVIs § 16.13, at 487; Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra
note 130, at 831.
151. See ibid; Frost, The Trouble With Zoning, 47 NAT'L MUNIc. REv.
275, 278 (1958).

152. BuRRus 67.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 130, at 334.
GEMMORN Bs
YE&
1159.
Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 180, at 834.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-11 (1963).
43 Ill. App. 2d 440, 193 N.E.2d 856 (1963).
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by statute, a zoning board of appeals should make findings of fact
when it grants an application for a special use because, inter alia,
they were essential to judicial review under the Administrative
Review Act.'5 s However, another Illinois case suggests a seemingly undesirable distinction: that standards and findings are unnecessary in dealing with special use applications where the local
legislature is the issuing body.'59 The result was to confuse labels
such as "legislature" with the governmental function actually
being exercised 6 0 and consequently, as pointed out by the dissent, to confer complete discretion upon the body administering
the flexibility device. Moreover, a decision not made in accordance with standards and which does not embody findings of
fact simply begs for judicial reaction beyond that required by
the issues in the case, if the reviewing court is more concerned
with the obvious dangers of such practices and less impressed
by labels than was the Illinois court. The dicta likely to result
from this reaction will probably cause unnecessary confusion
as to the validity of the flexibility devices themselves.
4.

The Subject Cases

Neither Olsen nor Golden considered whether standards,
findings of fact, or statements of non-conclusory reasons are
necessary ingredients of action taken upon requests for special
permits. Thus it is difficult to know whether their absence provoked the court's decisions or was immaterial. The speculation
of the court in both cases that the municipalities involved had
acted for impermissible reasons (aesthetic considerations) may
suggest concern with the absence of articulated and precise
standards and reasons for the administrative action. The court
has said that it will not inquire into the motives of a municipal
council when considering the validity of its legislative acts.'""
This accords with the views of other courts.162 However, the Olsen
158. Id. at 449, 193 N.E.2d at 861. The court noted that a special use
differed from a variation (also called variance), so that the statute requiring
the preparation of findings of fact and reasons to justify granting a variation
did not apply. Id. at 446, 193 N.E.2d at 859-60. There was no statutory provision explicitly dealing with special uses; they had been held impliedly
authorized by the zoning enabling act in Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 Ill.
2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601 (1960).
159. Id. at 187-88, 166 N.E.2d at 605. This case is criticized for its unconcern with reality in 46 IowA L. REV. 479 (1961).
160. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
161. E.g., Arcadia Dev. Corp v. City of Bloomington, 267 Minn. 221, 226,
125 N.W.2d 846, 851 (1964).
162. See 2 RATHKOPF 52-1 and cases cited therein.
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and Golden courts were confronted with administrative rather
than legislative action. Consequently their injuiry into motive
may reflect a legitimate concern that the absence of precise
standards and reasoning prevented the proper performance of
judicial review.
A few Minnesota decisions might have been viewed as holding
that standards for the issuance of special permits are not required where the governing body itself passes on the applications.
For example, State ex rel. Rose Bros. Lumber & Supply Co. v.
Clousingl3 rejected a claim that a Minneapolis ordinance which
required city council permission to erect a lumber yard without
imposing limitations upon the council's discretion was an unconstitutional delegation of power. However, the Rose court
relied upon cases 6'4 decided before zoning had been recognized
as constitutional, so that the council's discretion was implicitly
limited to determining whether the proposed use was likely to
constitute a nuisance. In view of the greater complexity of the
issues confronted in applying a special permit device under a
zoning ordinance than in determining whether a nuisance exists,
it would seem that Rose and the authorities upon which it relied
did not preclude a determination that standards were necessary
in the present context. Thus the Olsen court might have rested
its decision upon the absence of standards without departing
from precedent.
The necessity of using standards in applying special permit
devices is no longer debatable in Minneapolis. The new comprehensive zoning ordinance adopted by that city in 1963 authorizes
the use of a special permit device, which it terms a conditional
use, and enumerates governing standards which restate and
develop to a limited extent the standards contained in the state
enabling act."" The landowner is entitled to a hearing on his
163. 198 Minn. 35, 268 N.W. 844 (1936).
164. Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361 (1904); State v. Dirnberger, 152
Minn. 44, 187 N.W. 972 (1922); State v. Rosenstein, 148 Minn. 127, 181 N.W.
107 (1921); State v. Taubert, 196 Minn. 371, 148 N.W. 281 (1914).
165. MAirN. STAr. H§ 462.01, .05, .18 (1961). Minneapolis, Minn., Zoning
Ordinance, May 31, 1963, art. VI, para. 9f provides:
f. STANDARDS: No conditional use shall be recommended by the Board
of Adjustment unless such Board shall find:
(1) that the establishment, maintenance, or operation of the conditional
use will not be detrimental to or endanger the public health, safety,
morals, comfort, or general welfare,
(2) that the conditional use will not be injurious to the use and enjoyment of other property in the immediate vicinity for the purposes
already permitted, nor substantially diminish and impair property
values within the neighborhood,
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application before the board of adjustment, 6 6 which is required
to make written findings of fact from the evidence presented
at the hearing'" and report the same to a committee of the city
council, together with its recommendations. The city council
may then grant or deny the request.e 8 The ordinance does not
require the council to give reasons for its decision, though the
zoning enabling act discussed above" 9 doubtless obliges it to do
so.
The provisions of the St. Louis Park ordinance at issue in
Goldeno are sufficiently similar to those of the 1963 Minneapolis
ordinance that the Golden case may be a reasonable approximation of what would happen today in a case where the Minneapolis City Council refused a requested permit, except for the
fact that St. Louis Park is not subject to the written reasons
requirement imposed on first class cities by the state enabling
act.'7 1 The Golden court did not consider whether the standards
established by the ordinance were necessary and, if so, whether
they were sufficiently specific. Neither did it consider whether
the absence of a requirement that the city council make findings
of fact or elaborate its reasoning vitiated the ordinance or
whether it would judically impose such a requirement to save
the ordinance.
If the Golden court had considered the role of standards in
applying zoning flexibility devices, it might have discussed the
adequacy of the standards set forth in the St. Louis Park
ordinance, which seem only to mirror those contained in the
state zoning enabling acts to govern the enactment of zoning
(8) that the establishment of the conditional use will not impede the
normal and orderly development and improvement of the surrounding
property for uses permitted in the district,
(4) that adequate utilities, access roads, drainage and/or necessary
facilities have been or are being provided,
(5) that adequate measures have been or will be taken to provide
ingress and egress so designed as to minimize traffic congestion in the
public streets, and
(6) that the conditional use shall, in all other respects, conform to the
applicable regulations of the district in which it is located.
166. Minneapolis, Minn., Zoning Ordinance, May 31, 1963, art. VI,
para. 9d.
167. Minneapolis, Minn., Zoning Ordinance, May 31, 1963, art. VI,
para. 9e.
168. Ibid.
169. See note 88 supra.
170. See note 9 supra.
171. Mmr. STAT. § 462.18 (1961).
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ordinances.1 72 It is arguable that such standards are sufficiently
specific to help prevent the abuse of the discretionary authority
devolved upon the local administrative body. If so, it might be
suggested that the courts simply impose such standards upon
all municipalities utilizing a special permit device. Yet the
courts could reasonably believe that local development of
standards would serve to keep the attention of the governing
body focused upon proper decision-making criteria. Further,
selection of policy would then be left to the governing body
rather than the courts.
However, as pointed out earlier in this Note, the presence
of standards, no matter how specific or by whom they are
drawn, ought not be enough. This is especially true where there
are multiple standards. Unless findings of fact and a meaningful
written opinion accompany the denial of a permit application,
there is no way to afford anything but what is in effect de novo
judicial review. Such review merely duplicates the administrative function. But the only alternative would be total abdication
to the local body's decision. This in turn would trench on the
rights of both the public and the individual. The production
of a meaningful written opinion would both avoid duplication
by the court of the local body's functions and make possible a
meaningful judicial check on the process of administrative decision-making.
Of course the provision of the zoning enabling act for first
class cities, which requires the production of written reasons
for denial of a special permit, would not apply to St. Louis Park,
since it is not a first class city. Further, no similar requirement is
contained in the zoning enabling acts applicable to other municipalities.1 7 s This may reflect slight use of the special permit in
smaller communities or insufficient pressure by their inhabitants
to secure limitations on the use of the device. In any event, the
requirement of reasons in the enabling act for first class cities
indicates that at least in such cities the legislature felt that
the possibilities of discrimination in administration of the special
permit must be limited. No substantial reason appears to make
this any the less true in small municipalities. The Golden
situation was an excellent opportunity for the court to point
this out and to invalidate the permit denial for lack of accompanying findings and reasons.
172. See Mar. STAT. H§462.01, .05, .18 (1961).
173. M=r. STAT. §M 462.01, .05 (1961).
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If it be insisted that a local legislative body passing on permit
requests need not adhere to formulated standards nor make
findings of fact and a statement of reasons, the municipality
may well suffer rather than profit. Even if a presumption of
validity does and should attach to a municipal ordinance, the
subject cases make it clear that this is not true with respect to
a particularized application of an administrative provision of
an ordinance, since the justification underlying the presumption
is inapplicable in the latter situation."' Further, as a practical
matter a complainant should have an easier time convincing
a court that denial of a permit application was arbitrary if the
ordinance under which the action was taken contained no
standards or if the action was unaccompanied by a meaningful
opinion or nonconclusory findings of fact and reasons. Even if
proper reasons for the municipality's action exist, the fact that
they are stated contemporaneously is likely to increase the
chance that they will be found adequate on review. A charge
of afterthought is then considerably less persuasive. Moreover,
a meaningful opinion permits establishment of a body of precedent for the benefit of both the municipality and landowners,
somewhat reducing the uncertainty implicit in the use of zoning
flexibility devices. This is especially significant if the incidence
of appeal from application of these devices is slight. It is contended, therefore, that whether the requirement of a meaningful
written opinion is legislatively, judicially, or voluntarily imposed,
it may be expected to facilitate rather than hinder the development of zoning flexibility.
B.

HoLD ORDER

The hold order encountered in Alexander might also be
viewed as a measure for achieving some degree of flexibility in
land use planning. Such orders have been used long and frequently in Minneapolis1"' for various purposes, such as preventing the frustration of pending zoning ordinances through
precluding the creation of nonconforming uses, freezing the
development of privately owned property which the city expects
to condemn in the future for road building, and conferring
virtual veto power over construction in particular wards. Thus,
174. See note 126 supra.
175. In 1959 there were in effect 91 hold orders covering 10% to 15% of
the land area of the city, some dating back 20 years. Planning and Zoning
Comm. of the Citizens League of Minneapolis and Hennepin County, Report,
March 25, 1959.
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they seem to have been used as a sort of all-purpose, unlimited
special permit device. 78
The alleged reason for using a hold order in Alexander was
to freeze construction in the area to which it was applicable
while a proposal for a new comprehensive zoning ordinance
was pending. The order in Alexander directing the building inspector not to issue building permits for specified property was
embodied in a city council resolution, and consequently was
not subject to the waiting period and publication requirements
applicable to ordinances. 7 7
It has usually been held that zoning ordinances may not
constitutionally be applied to uses existing when they take
effect-termed legal nonconforming uses. 7 s They are by definition likely to be incompatible with surrounding uses permitted
under the ordinance. To the extent that they are, realization
of zoning objectives will be frustrated by their presence'o
. This
is particularly true if their existence becomes a basis for granting
variances or amendments for the benefit of neighboring landowners. The studies, drafting, and deliberations required to
prepare and enact a comprehensive zoning ordinance mean
that a considerable period will almost certainly elapse between
the time when deficiencies in land-use planning are recognized
and the effective date of remedial legislation. 0 Unless develop176. Ibid.
177. It was stipulated in Alexander, 267 Minn. at 159 n.2, 125 N.W.2d at
586 n.2, that the hold order was not an ordinance. The distinction between
a hold order and an ordinance is not described in either the briefs and record
or the opinion of the Alexander case. However, the Minneapolis Municipal
Charter requires that ordinances and resolutions be enacted by a majority of
the city council. Mumnpous, MuNm., Cry CHARTER ch. 4, § 9 (1963). The
same section then requires a waiting period between the first reading and
passage of ordinances, and continues: "When approved, they shall be recorded
by the City Clerk . . . and before they shall be in force they shall be published in the official paper of the city." It is unclear from the context whether
"they" refers to both ordinances and resolutions, or merely the former. However, the Hennepin County District Court said in an earlier, unreported decision invalidating a hold order that "the result of holding [the order valid] . . .
would be uncertainty and chaos. One would have to comb the minutes of
every City Council meeting to know what law governed." Brief for Respondent, p. 9, Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 267 Minn. 155, 125 N.W.2d
583 (1963). Thus it may be inferred that a hold order is properly classifiable
as a "resolution" and consequently is not subject to the waiting period and
publication requirements.
178. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 63 supra and accompaning text.
180. See HoRAcK & NoLAN, LAND UsE CONTROLs 48 (1955); Note, 14 W.
RES. L. REv. 135, 148 (1962).
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ment contrary to the tenor of the proposed new ordinance can
be prohibited during this period, opportunists may obtain a
legal right to continue such development at the expense of
neighbors and competitors. Moreover, unsuspecting landowners
may obtain a permit and prepare for construction during this
period, only to be halted when the new ordinance becomes
effective if preparations have not proceeded far enough to create
an existing use.'s'
Thus it would appear to be in the interest of both municipalities and to a limited extent even landowners to restrict the
planning and construction of uses which are likely to become
nonconforming under a pending zoning ordinance. The problem
is to find a way in which to do this which accommodates all
interests as fairly as possible.
Several types of interim zoning measures, such as hold orders,
have been employed in attempts to restrict the acquisition of
nonconforming uses and to prevent needless loss by landowners
during the incubation periods of comprehensive zoning ordinances. An even less formal measure which has sometimes been
successfully employed is mere refusal to issue permits during
the pendency of a comprehensive zoning ordinance. 8 2 Another,
the temporary or interim zoning ordinance, has been the more
orthodox measure by which municipalities have attempted to
solve this problem. Yet the courts have often been rather unsympathetic to the municipalities' problem. Thus they have
frequently construed constitutional and statutory provisions
narrowly to invalidate such stopgap or interim measures'" on
grounds of non-authorization by the constitution or enabling
act,' 4 or noncompliance with the procedural requirements of
the enabling act.8 5 Occasionally they have even suggested that
such measures are unnecessary.'s On the other hand, some
181. See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
182. See Wheat v. Barrett, 210 Cal. 193, 290 Pac. 103 (1930); Chicago
Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Palatine, 22 Ill. App. 2d 264, 160 N.E.2d 697
(1959); Beverly Bldg. Corp v. Board of Adjustment, 409 Pa. 417, 187 A.2d 567
(1963); A. J. Aberman, Inc. v. New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586
(1954); Gold v. Building Comm., 334 Pa. 10, 5 A.2d 367 (1939).
183. See Note, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 135, 143 (1962).
184. Downey v. City of Sioux City, 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125 (1929).
185. E.g., City of Somerset v. Weise, 263 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1954); Krajenke Buick Sales v. Kopkowski, 822 Mich. 250, 33 N.W.2d 781 (1948); State
ex rel. Kramer v. Schwartz, 336 Mo. 932, 82 S.W.2d 63 (1935).
186. Kline v. Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 452-53, 68 A.2d 182, 189 (1949).
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courts have upheld interim measures, emphasizing their reasonableness even where their effective period is not expressly
limited, 8 7 by finding them to be impliedly authorized' 8 and
of limited duration.'
A court ought, and doubtless would be much more inclined,
to find a stopgap zoning measure valid where its effectiveness
is expressly limited to a reasonable period of time9 o and where
it forbids only uses which are prohibited by the provisions of
the pending ordinance. The latter restriction would prevent the
use of interim devices until the proposed comprehensive zoning
ordinance is sufficiently developed to indicate the uses which
would be permitted in various areas. This point of development
no doubt would vary somewhat among localities, depending
upon the procedures followed in enacting comprehensive zoning
ordinances. Nevertheless, in most cases it would seem likely
to yield a fair compromise.
In view of the serious problem which they are designed to
remedy, interim zoning measures ought to be upheld through
liberal construction of constitutional and statutory provisions,
if they are fairly limited both as to period of validity and prohibitions on construction. Conversely, the absence of such limitation reasonably should result in judicial rejection of the device,
but only as insufficiently limited. Moreover, the courts ought to
187. See Haar, "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARv.

L.

REv. 1154, 1163 (1955).

188. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 496, 234 Pac. 381, 888
(1925); Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742, 7 S.W.2d 219 (1928); see Downham v.
City Council, 58 F.2d 784, 788 (E.D. Va. 1932); Butvinik v. Mayor of Jersey
City, 6 N.J. Misc. 803, 142 Atl. 759 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
189. See Mang v. County of Santa Barbara, 182 Cal. App. Ed 93, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 724 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960). But see Deerfield Realty Co. v. Hague, 8 N.J.
Misc. 637, 638, 151 Atl. 373, 374 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
On the general subject of interim or temporary zoning regulations, see
HoRACK &NoLAN, LAND USE CoNTRoLs 48-53 (1955); 1 YoRnwy, MuNacint.
ConRPonATos § 158 (1956); Haar, supra note 187, at 1163-65; Note, 14 W. RES.
L. REV. 135 (1962).

190. A resolution or hold order of limited duration was sustained in Hunter
v. Adams, 180 Cal. App. 2d 511, 4 Cal. Rptr. 776 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960). A city
council had passed a resolution forbidding issuance of building permits for
one year in a proposed redevelopment area. The court noted only incidental
injury to appellants; there was no finding of deprivation of property or diminution of property value, aside from the expense of preparing plans and of
delay in erecting the contemplated structure. Analogizing from an earlier
zoning case, the court found the resolution reasonably necessary to serve a
public purpose. See cases cited note 188 infra and accompanying text.
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recognize that the utility of interim zoning devices will be substantially eliminated if their enactment depends upon compliance with time-consuming procedural requirements.
In the Alexander case the zoning enabling act contained no
express provision for a hold order, though one might have been
implied. Further, there was no restriction on the period of time
for which the order would be effective, although a reasonable
time limit might have been judicially imposed. Moreover, the
order permitted no construction on the land. Yet had the city
limited the effective duration of the hold order and provided
that construction permits would be issued for structures clearly
compatible with the proposed new ordinance, the court might
well have found that the enabling act, by implication, permitted
the use of such a device as an essential incident to the enactment
of a comprehensive zoning ordinance.' 9 ' The nine year duration
of the Alexander order and the breadth of its scope probably
prevented its enforcement, but did not require the condemnation
of hold orders generally.
Whatever might have been, the breadth of the court's reaction 92 to the unlimited hold order was such that it might well
be thought that legislative action is now necessary to authorize
the future use of a properly limited flexibility device of this
nature in Minnesota.'s Yet it might reasonably be argued that
the court left the door ajar, and could distinguish Alexander to
uphold a fairly limited interim zoning measure in the future.
Strictly speaking, it held only that the applicable enabling act
did not authorize the indefinite suspension of zoning ordinances.' 9 4 It only speculated that the validity of the hold order
would have been doubtful even if it had been enacted as an
ordinance. Further, the court acknowledged that several other
courts had upheld such stopgap devices where they were effective
for only short periods of time and noted by way of contrast
that the Alexander hold order had been in effect over nine
years. 9 5
It might fairly be concluded that municipal carelessness, if
not worse, in failing to impose adequate safeguards upon the
use of this zoning flexibility device, may have resulted in unnecessary restriction on municipal capacity to anticipate and
thwart the growth of nonconforming uses.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See cases cited note 188 supra.
See text accompanying notes 12 & 13 supra.
See 49 Mu=. L. REv. 109, 112 (1964).
267 Minn. at 159, 125 N.W.2d at 586.
267 Minn. at 159 n.3, 125 N.W.2d at 586 n.3.
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CONCLUSION
Since the local legislative bodies in Olsen and Golden applied
the special permit ordinances to individual cases, they acted in
an administrative capacity. Therefore, the court should have
considered in both cases whether to require standards, written
findings of fact, and a statement of the reasons for the decision.
In Olsen the ordinance permitted the operation of a filling
station only after a special permit had been obtained, but
failed to establish standards or require written findings of fact
or reasons for the council's conclusions. The court could have
relied upon these deficiencies in reaching its result. In Golden
standards existed but a meaningful written explanation of their
application in particular cases was not required. This could have
been the basis of the court's decision. In Alexander the court
unfortunately made no inquiry into the very real problem
prompting the use of interim zoning measures and the functions
which they service. The obvious impropriety of the hold order's
nine-year effective duration may indicate that the court's cryptic
treatment of the issue ought to be construed as evidence of
admirable judicial self-restraint. Yet the uncertainty as to the
legal status of any interim zoning device likely to be generated
by such treatment and the importance of the problem should
have prompted a clearer consideration of the issue.
The subject cases probably indicate that the employment
by a municipality of devices to impart flexibility to zoning,
without properly limiting their exercise, may risk judicial reaction beyond the matter requiring decision. Thus in each case
the result reached by the court could and should have been based
upon the inadequate limitation of the zoning flexibility measures.
It is possible that the reason for the result in each case was
apprehension over municipal attempts to achieve zoning flexibility without proper channeling of the administrative machinery, in spite of the fact that the language utilized does not
clearly reflect this concern. If this is in fact the basis for the
decisions, much of the disturbing language encountered in the
opinions may be dismissed as ill-considered dicta. Nevertheless,
the confusion which has arisen from these dicta, if such they be,
makes prompt explanation desirable. "[A] right result reached
by unsound reasons gives no assurance of permanent acquisition."oo
196. L. Hand, Have the Bench and Bar Anything To Contribute to the
Teaching of Law, 5 Ai-%mncAlo L. ScHooL REv. 621, 624 (1926).

